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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996, South Africa brought into creation one of the most advanced
constitutions in history. Most notably, this Constitution was the first to
explicitly include socio-economic rights as justiciable and binding rights
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for its citizens and permanent residents.' Sections 26 and 27 of South
Africa's Bill of Rights enshrine the rights to housing, health, food, water,
and social security into the Constitution.2 These rights were intended to be
something more than the mere guiding principles of India's Constitution
that had previously represented the strongest effective application of socioeconomic rights in a constitutional order. Instead, South Africa's
Constitution arose from the ashes of the apartheid experience as a
revolutionary document unlike any other.4

1. See In re Certificationofthe Constitutionofthe Republic ofS. Aft. 1996(10) BCLR 1253
(CC)
76-78; see also Khosa & Others v Minister of Soc. Dev. & Others; Mahlaule& Others v
MinisterofSoc. Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 9 (holding that permanent residents are
also entitled to the right to social security).
2. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2 (Bill of Rights) § 26-27.
Housing 26 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (2) The
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. (3) No one may be
evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court
made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit
arbitrary evictions . . . Health care, food, water and social security 27. (1)
Everyone has the right to have access to healthcare services, including
reproductive healthcare; sufficient food and water; and social security, including,
if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social
assistance. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of
these rights. (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
Id. Section 28 further elaborates on and adds to these same rights as to children. See id § 28.
3. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC)
19.
[I]t is important to bear in mind that our Constitution is structured differently to
the Indian Constitution. Unlike the Indian Constitution ours deals specifically in
the bill of rights with certain positive obligations imposed on the State, and where
it does so, it is our duty to apply the obligations as formulated in the Constitution
and not to draw inferences that would be inconsistent therewith.
Id.; see also Kamayani B. Mahabal, ComparativeCase Law: Focus on India: Enforcingthe Right
to Food in India: The Impact of Social Activism, 5 ESR REV. (2004), available at
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr2004/2004marchindia.php.
4. See S. AFR. CONST 1996 pmbl.
We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those
who suffered for justice and freedom in our land .... We therefore, through our
freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the
Republic so as to Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights....
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However, despite being explicitly recognized as justiciable rights that
are interdependent and interconnected with the classic political and civil
rights included in the South African Bill of Rights,5 socio-economic rights
are subject to the internal limitation of "available resources." 6 Section
27(2) of the Constitution clearly limits socio-economic rights, stating that
"[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
availableresources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these
rights."7
What the South African Constitutional Court has not yet addressed and
developed is the fundamental meaning of the "available resources"
limitation. There are always more resources at the disposal of national
governments: the unexploited resources of the income, property and sales
tax bases, higher import duties, the potential economic benefits of
liberalized international trade policies, the potential economic benefits of
protectionist trade policies, state property and asset holdings, reduced
defense and intelligence spending, and countless other sources. However,
there is a clear difference between "resources" and the "available
resources" referenced in the South African Constitution.' The choice of the

Id; see also generally City Council of Pretoriav J Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC).
5. See Gov 't of the Republic ofS. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) 23, at 45 ("All the rights in our Bill of Rights are interrelatedand mutually
supporting.")(emphasis added); id. 24, at 46 (The right imposed by section 26 and the other
"Socio-economic rights must all be readtogether in the setting of the Constitutionas a whole...
[t]heir interconnectednessneeds to be taken into account... in particularin determiningwhether
the state has met its obligations.. ") (emphasis added); id. 83, at 98 ("The proposition that
rights are interrelatedand are all equally important is not merely a theoretical postulate.")
(emphasis added); see alsoIn re Certification,1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) 77, at 98 ("In our view
it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred
upon the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it
results in a breach of the separation of powers.").
6. S. AR. CONST. 1996 ch. 6 (Bill of Rights) §§ 26-27.
7. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 6 (Bill of Rights) § 27(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, section
26 reads "[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right." Id. § 26(2).
8. It should be noted that the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights which provided the inspiration and basis for socio-economic rights in the South African
Constitution uses the term "maximum ofavailable resources," while the South African Constitution
uses "available resources." See International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights,
art. 2, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered intoforce Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR].
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

5

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

term "available resources" cannot be attributed to a mere slight of hand by
the Constitution's drafters.
The most important question in South African socio-economic rights
cases then becomes: when do resources become available within the
meaning of sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution?9 Presently, the
Constitutional Court has not explicitly answered this question. Instead, in
considering all of its socio-economic rights cases, the Court in practice has
looked to the amount of money allocated to departments and programs.°
The lack of guidance as to the process by which the Court does or should
evaluate "available resources" in the context of sections 26(2) and 27(2)
is most evident in the surprising reality that previous socio-economic
rights cases do not provide explicit guidance as to which party bears the
burden of proof when the state claims resource constraints as a defense to
claims for socio-economic rights."1

progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including the adoption of legislative measures.
Id.(emphasis added).
9. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 6 (Bill of Rights) § 26(2) ("The state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its availableresources,to achieve the progressive realisation
of this right.") (emphasis added); id.§ 27(2).
10. In Soobramoney v. MinisterofHealth,the Court looked at the hospital's allocated budget
for the service in question, and then to the provincial Department of Health Budget of KwaZuluNatal. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). The
Court also focused on the question of the over-expenditure of the provincial Department of Health
Budget to find that no resources were available. In Government ofthe Republic of South Africa v.
Grootboom, the Grootboom court did not consider whether resources were available. See Gov't of
the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). The
Grootboom court held that in regards to the budget resources that were made available, a significant
part of these resources must go to address the needs of the most desperate. In Minister of Health
v. Treatment Action Campaign, the Court looked at the total combined allocated budgets of the
departments that dealt in some way with mother-to-child transmission of HIV prevention programs,
and found that more money had recently been allocated to these programs. As a result, the Court
determined that resources were therefore "available." See MinisterofHealth & Others v Treatment
Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC). In Khosa v. Minister of Social
Development, the court looked to the recent increase in the allocated future budget of the
Department of Social Development and found that a large amount of additional funds had been
allocated. See Khosa & Others v Ministerof Soc. Dev. & Others; Mahlaule & Others v Minister
ofSoc. Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). The court found that the increased funding to the
department would greatly offset the projected cost increase the modified measures would require.
Id.
11. However, the court has taken small steps in giving definition to this onus. In Khosa v.
MinisterofSocial Development, the court held that when considering evidence regarding resources
"[i]fthe necessary evidence is not placed before the courts dealing with such matters their ability
to perform their constitutional mandate will be hampered and the constitutional scheme itself put

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss1/5
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Thus, establishing a clear relationship between socio-economic rights
and their internal resources limitations necessitates investigation of
complicated questions that the South African Constitutional Court has not
yet addressed. And while the answers to these questions are complex and
debatable, what is clear is that for socio-economic rights in South Africa
to be more than illusory rights, the concept of available resources must be
more than merely governmentally allocated resources. In fact, if these
rights are entirely allocative then they are, and will continue to be, merely
"rights waiting for change." In the hopes of proving otherwise, this Article
articulates potential alternatives to South Africa's current available
resources jurisprudence by delineating and answering questions essential
to understanding fully the scope and impact of the available resources
limitation.
Part ILwill chart the South African Constitutional Court's current
approach to the available resources limitation by closely tracking the
relevant language of the Court's judgments. I will highlight and briefly
comment on the potential implications of this language with an eye
towards expanding socio-economic rights. I will also pose hypotheticals
that tease out the implications of the Court's language. Part III will
identify and discuss the major problems and shortcoming of the Court's
current "available resources" jurisprudence. Lastly, Part IV will suggest
possible, preferable alternatives to the Court's current approach. In this
final part, I will use the Court's previous jurisprudence as a foundation for

at risk. It is the government's duty to ensure that the relevant evidence is placed before the court."
Khosa, 2004 (6) BCLR (CC) 19, at 37 (citing Dawood & Another v Minister of Home Aff &
Others, Shalabi & Another v Minister of Home Aff. & Others, Thomas & Another v. Minister of
Home Aff. & Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC)). Although not a socioeconomic rights case, the Constitutional Court's recent ruling in Rail Commuter Action Group v.
TransnetLtd tia Metrorail,went further than any previous ruling in detailing the resources inquiry
when evaluating positive obligations when it held that "[a] final consideration will be the relevant
human and financial resource constraints that may hamper the organ of state in meeting its
obligation. This last criterion will require careful consideration when raised. In particular, an organ
of state will not be held to ha-ve reasonably performed a duty simply on the basis of a bald assertion
of resource constraints. Details of the precise character of the resource constraints, whether human
or financial, in the context of the overall resourcing of the organ of the state will need to be
provided." Rail Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd tia Metrorail 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC)
88, at 107. Although helpful regarding the evidentiary onus, the case is vulnerable to being easily
distinguished in South African courts because, unlike the rights relied upon in Rail Commuter
Action Group, socio-economic rights have an internal available resources limitation. Until the Court
directly applies the reasoning in Rail Commuter Action Group to a socio-economic rights case in
which the defendant state raises the defense of available resources, it cannot be assumed that the
Constitutional Court sees Rail Commuter Action Group as directly applicable to socio-economic
rights cases.
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the proposed alternatives. Following this analysis of South African
jurisprudence, this Article looks outward and proposes alternatives to the
current approach based on alternative bodies of jurisprudence that the
Court has not yet considered in full.
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The Constitutional Court has directly addressed the positive obligations
of socio-economic rights on four occasions: Soobramoney v. Minister of
Health, Kwa-Zulu-Natal, Government of the Republic ofSouth Africa and
Others v. Grootboom and Others, Minister of Health and Others v.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, and Khosa and Others v.
Minister of Social Development and Others.'2 In analyzing the following
discussion, the reader should keep in mind that academics in South Africa
and elsewhere have not commented extensively on the great majority of
the language relevant to the available resources limitation. 3 As a result, a

12. See Soobramoney v Minister ofHealth, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC);
Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC);
Minister ofHealth & Othersv TreatmentAction Campaign& Others2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC);
Khosa, (6) BCLR 569 (CC). The Constitutional Court also recently decided President of the
Republic of South Africa v. Modderklip. See Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. v Modder East
Squatters & Another 2001 (4) SA 385. While this case does discuss the right to housing, it does so
mostly in the context of the negative right to be protected from evictions under section 26(3) and
the right to property under section 25. Moreover, the Court chose not to decide the case on these
issues, but reached its conclusion solely by reliance on an infringement of the landowner's right
of access to a court under section 34. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 6 (Bill of Rights) § 34. As a
result, Modderklip has little to no relevance to positive socio-economic rights, let alone to the
available resources limitation that is the subject of this Article.
13. But see Darrel Moellendorf, ReasoningAbout Resources: Soobramoneyand the Future
of Socio-EconomicRights Claims, 14 (SAJHR) (1998) (specifically discussing the complications
and problems of interpreting the available resources limitations of sections 26 and 27). There are
also commentators who have briefly or indirectly touched upon the specific issue. See Sandra
Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (Mathew
Chaskalson et al. eds., 1998); CASS R. SUNsTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS
Do221-39(2001); Pierre De Vos, Pious Wishes orDirectlyEnforceableHumanRights? Socialand
EconomicRights in SouthAfrica's 1996 Constitution, 13 SAJIHR 67,97-98 (1997); Anja Snellman,
The Development of a Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa (Spring 2002)
(unpublished minor field study), availableathttp://www.afrikagruppema.se/usrd/agm488.pdf; see
also Theunis Roux, Legitimating Transformation: PoliticalResource Allocation in the South
African ConstitutionalCourt, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY (Siri Gloppen et al eds.,
2004), available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/t/pdf/norwaypaper.pdf; Murray Wesson,
Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudenceof the South African
ConstitutionalCourt,20 SAJHR (2004); see alsogenerally SHAAMELA CASSIEM &JUDITH STREAK,
BUDGETING FOR CHILD SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS (Erika Coetzee ed., 2001).
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major contribution of this Article is simply the attempt to comprehensively
identify and analyze the language that is relevant to the available resources
question, a goal that has not yet been the focus of an extensive academic
piece. For this reason, the analysis of existing case law errs on the side of
over breadth.
A second dynamic of which the reader should be aware is that while
there are various international instruments that could assist in the difficult
task of interpreting the Court's socio-economic rights available resources
jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court views international law as
persuasive when interpreting the South African Constitution unless the
international instrument has been formally ratified by the state. 4 Because
South Africa has not ratified the International Covenant of Economic
Social and Cultural Rights on which its socio-economic constitutional
rights are based, the plain text of the South African Constitution, and the
actual language of the Court's judgments will be the most relevant in
fleshing out the context and significance of the available resources
limitation. Thus, each of the four South African socio-economic rights
cases will be examined in the order in which they were decided.
A. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu-Natal
In Soobramoney, its first socio-economic rights judgment, the
Constitutional Court laid the groundwork for socio-economic rights
jurisprudence in South Africa. The following part sets forth the Court's
language regarding available resources and explains the language's
implications for socio-economic rights.
1. Background
Soobramoney involves a petition for life-prolonging dialysis treatment
filed by a plaintiff with chronic renal failure and no chance of long-term
survival. Under the treatment guidelines of Addington Hospital in Durban,
South Africa, the plaintiff did not qualify for dialysis because of his other
health problems. t5 The plaintiff subsequently filed suit claiming that his

14. See S. AFR.CONST. § 39; S.AFR.CONST. §§ 231-235; Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169

(CC) 26, at 49 ("The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to
be attached to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary. However, where the
relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be directly applicable.").
Potentially relevant sources of international human rights law regarding the subject of this Article
include: ICESR, the Charter of the United Nations, pertinent General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions, and the African Charter on People's and Human Rights.
15. See Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC)
1-5.
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right to emergency healthcare under section 27(3) of the Constitution
entitled him to dialysis. 6 The Court rejected this claim, reasoning that
chronic renal failure did not constitute an "emergency" condition. 7 The
Court then analyzed the claim under section 27(2), which enshrines the
positive right to healthcare services, and upheld the hospital's rejection of
the plaintiffs claim. Pointing to the limited availability of dialysis
machines and applying a lenient rational basis standard of review, the
Court held that the state had met its healthcare obligations to society under
section 27(2). 18 The Court further held that the right to healthcare services
does not provide a direct personal entitlement to dialysis treatment.' 9 The
Court grounded its reasoning in the limited nature of available resources,
the fact that the illness was chronic and arguably not an emergency, and
the disruptive effects unlimited entitlements to expensive medical
treatment would have upon South Africa's national health program.2"
2. Available Resources Jurisprudence
In directly addressing the available resources question, the Court in
Soobramoney held:
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations
imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 in regard to access to
housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent
upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack
of resources.2 '
This language sheds light on important aspects of Soobramoney's
available resources jurisprudence. The first implication is that courts
should make determinations of whether resources are available for a given
socio-economic right by reviewing the total amount of resources allocated
by the government for the general purpose of fulfilling all of the state's
socio-economic rights obligations. To explain, the Court's language
frames resource availability within the context of resources made available
by the state for "such purposes." The precise meaning of "such purposes"
16. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 27(3); see alsoSoobramoney v MinisterofHealth,KwaZuluNatal 1998 (1) SA 765 7, at 15.
17. See Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 765 34.
18. Id. IT 30-31, 36.

19. Id. 7711, 36.
20. Id.753;see also id.

21. Id.

21.

11 (emphasis added).
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is open to two possible interpretations of the relationship between (a) the
state's budgetary allocation of resources for certain socio-economic rights
"purposes;" and (b) the state's subsequent fulfillment of its constitutionally
mandated socio-economic rights "obligations." The first interpretation of
the phrase "such purposes" is that resources made available for a socioeconomic right "obligation" may be put to use generally, i.e., for the
"purpose" of fulfilling any socio-economic rights obligation. The second
interpretation is that resources made available for a specific socioeconomic right "obligation" must be put to use specifically, that is, solely
for the "purpose" of fulfilling that same specific socio-economic right. The
former interpretation would allow courts to consider resources made
available for the right to water when analyzing resource availability as to
the right to food. In contrast, the latter limits the availability of resources
for housing to only those resources made available specifically for
fulfilling the right to housing.
The practical effect of the first interpretation is that when courts look
to see whether resources are available, they would look to the entire
amount of money "available" for all socio-economic rights. Because
scholars have repeatedly characterized socio-economic rights as rights that
are interconnected, the former interpretation-that resources made
available for a socio-economic right "obligation" may be put to use
generally for the "purpose" of any other socio-economic right-is most
likely to be correct.22 In the Court's words,
The right of access to adequate housing cannot be seen in isolation.
There is a close relationship between it and the other socioeconomic rights. Socio-economic rights must all be readtogether
in the setting of the Constitution as a whole. Their
interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in interpreting
the socio-economic rights, and, in particular, in determining
whether the State has met its obligations in terms of them. 3
The second implication of the section under inquiry is that resource
limitations do not entirely define the content of socio-economic rights in
South Africa. Instead, the Court suggests that the content of the rights is
"limitedby reason of the lack of resources. 24 What is important is that the
Court uses the word limited in place of more restrictive language, such as
22. See Gov 't of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. See Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 765 11 (emphasis added).
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"defined" or "created by." Thus, while resource constraints limit socioeconomic rights, this limitation does not define entirely the content of the
rights. Later language in Soobramoney likewise emphasizes that the
"available resources" limitation is not the single defining factor used to
determine the content of socio-economic rights. The Court states, "[o]ne
of the limitingfactors to the attainment of the Constitution's guarantees is
that of limited or scarce resources. 25
Along similar lines, the Court, in a separate portion of the
Soobramoney judgment, describes its deferential approach to issues
involving difficult budgetary decisions:
The provincial administration which is responsible for health
services in Kwa-Zulu-Natal has to make decisions about funding
that should be made available for healthcare and how such funds
should be spent. These choices involve difficult decisions to be
taken at the political level in fixing the health budget, and at the
functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met. A court
will be slow to interferewith rationaldecisions taken in goodfaith
by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility
it is to deal with such matters.26
This policy of deference to the state regarding complicated budgetary
decisions has become a fundamental principle of the Court's current
jurisprudence. However, while the Court in Soobramoney acknowledges
the place of deference to state expertise in complicated political budgetary
questions, it does not bar itself completely from overruling state decisions.
The Court's finding that it "will be slow to interfere with rational decisions
taken in good faith" is not by any means a statement that it would never do
so.27 In addition, the Court's opinion states only that it will be slow to
interfere with decisions that are "rational" and made in "good faith." This
additional requirement implies that the judiciary should not grant usual
deference to state decisions made in "bad faith," even if they are rational.28
25. It should be especially noted that when referring to resources in this paragraph the Court
is actually not directly referencing financial resources, but physical resources. Id. 43 (emphasis
added) ("In the present case the limited haemodialysis facilities, inclusive of haemodialysis
machines, beds, and trained staff constitute the limited or scarce facilities.").
26. Id. 29 (emphasis added).
27. Id.(emphasis added).
28. See id. 29. Although the articulated rational basis standard of review is incredibly weak,
and will almost always result in the approval of state action, the "good faith" requirement is a
potentially strong basis with which to support an argument that the normal deference should not
apply to a given governmental decision. Sandra Liebenberg utilizes a good faith approach when she
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When evaluating the state's socio-economic rights obligations in
Soobramoney,the Court appears to lay out the methodological foundation
for the subsequent "reasonable national plan" standard of review adopted
subsequently by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom.29 This standard,
now fundamental to South African jurisprudence, maintains that
individuals are not entitled to make direct claims to the government for
personal entitlements and immediate fulfillment of their positive socioeconomic rights under sections 26(2) and 27(2).30 Instead, the "holistic
approach" of a reasonable national plan will in some cases substitute for
the direct entitlement of an individual when appropriate because "[t]he
State has to manage its limited resources in order to address all these
claims. There will be times when this requires it to adopt a holistic
approach to the larger needs of society rather than
to focus on the specific
31
needs of particular individuals within society."
In summary, the Court in Soobramoney lays forth several foundational
elements of the available resources requirement. The next part analyzes
how the Court applied its own standards to the set of "available resources"
facts present in Soobramoney.
3. The Court's Investigation of Resources: Application of Jurisprudence
In the first part of its judgment, the Court describes and outlines what
standards it should apply to the available resources question. A further
important issue is how the Court actually applied these standards to the
facts of the case. Upon examination, the Court took a two-step approach
towards investigating the state's limited resources defense. First, the Court
focused on the allocated budget of the specific hospital that denied the
plaintiff dialysis treatment. The Court states,

finds that it may be useful in challenging the usual deference the Court shows to allocation
decisions. See, e.g., Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa's EvolvingJurisprudenceon Socio-Economic
Rights, 20, Community Law Centre, available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/
Projects/Socio-Economic-Rights/research/socio-economic-rights-jurisprudence/evolvingjurisprudence.pdf/attachmentdownload/file.
29. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) 146.
30. See id. IT 95, 108. Although the court only explicitly cites section 26, its counterpart
section 27, because, unlike section 28, has the same textual structure and available resources
limitation, is implicitly included in this analysis. However, children not in their parents care, may
make direct claims of individual entitlement to the state under section 28.
31. Id. 31.
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Additional dialysis machines and more trained nursing staff are
required to enable it to do this, but the hospital budget does not
make provision for such expenditure.32 The hospital would like to
have its budget increased but it has been told by the provincial
health department that funds are not available for this purpose.33
The Court did not scrutinize the available resources of the National
Health Department nor of the Provincial Health Department of Zwa-ZuluNatal. Instead, the initial inquiry ended at the hospital's assertion that their
allocated budget did not allow for increased spending on dialysis, and that
the provincial Health Department had represented to the hospital that it did
not have funds available for the requested purpose. Significantly, the Court
did not probe the accuracy of the hospital's assertions or inquire into how
the hospital had used its funds.
Moreover, the Court's inquiry into available funds was specific, rather
than generalized. For example, the inquiry did not involve looking at the
hospital's overall budget. Instead, the inquiry considered exclusively the
portion of the hospital's budget designated for dialysis treatment. This
approach arguably fails to analyze fully what resources are objectively
"available," or to look for any causes of the lack of available funds.
Pointedly, other hospital programs could have had unused funds, which
could have been transferred to dialysis treatment.
The Court's second step in evaluating the state's available resources
defense was to look directly at the provincial Department of Health of
Kwa-Zulu-Natal's overall budget. In reviewing this budget, the Court
pointed to the provincial government's over-expenditure as further
evidence that resources were not "available:"
At present the Department of Health in Kwa-Zulu-Natal does not
have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the services which are
being provided to the public. In 1996-1997 it overspent its budget
by R152 million and in the current year it is anticipated that the
overspending will be R700 million rand unless a serious cutback is
made in the services which it provides.34

32. Nor does it even say with certainty that there was no allocated programmatic money
actually available in real terms. The budgeted expenditures do not necessarily match actual
expenditures, and the program could have had unused money that would have allowed them to buy
more machines than the budget had originally proscribed.
33. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 765 T 2 (emphasis added).
34. Id. 24.
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Indeed, after reviewing the hospital's allocated budget, the next logical
place to look for funds should very well have been within the larger
provincial Department of Health budget. However, by simplistically
addressing the provincial Department of Health's overall budget, the Court
ignores the possibility that the Provincial Department may have been
responsible for such over-expenditure (e.g., potential corruption,
mismanagement, inefficiency). Such an approach also ignores the
possibility that other programs, aside from dialysis, could be responsible
for the over-expenditure that the Court points to as evidence of resource
unavailability. Without a comprehensive approach analyzing both the
specifically allocated budget, and any unused funds, courts will have an
incomplete picture of the Provincial Department of Health's actual
"available resources."
In summary, the first stage of the court's investigation into available
resources was to look at the hospital's allocated budget. After examining
the hospital's budget, it found that no more money had been allocated. The
Court then fails to address effectively whether there were alternate
available hospital funds. In the second stage of its investigation, the Court
looks to see if the provincial Health Department had overspent funds.
Despite the generally restrictive language of the case, this second step
actually demonstrates that the Court will not just consider the amounts
allocated to specific programs or offices, but is also willing, at least to a
limited degree, to peer into the entire general provincial departmental
budget when evaluating available resources. If the Court was absolutely
unwilling to mandate allocation of additional funds for dialysis from either
the provincial Department of Health Budget or an unrelated program, there
would seem little reason for the Court to include an analysis of the overall
Kwa-Zulu-Natal Provincial Department of Health budget. At the same
time, however, it should be noted that the Court did not consider the
budget of the National Department of Health.35
After using the described approach to find that there were no available
resources and, correspondingly, that the state's available resources defense
was valid, the Court then applied a rationality standard of review.36 In
doing so, the Court found that the hospital's decision to limit treatment to
those who could survive related rationally to the purpose of extending the
right to healthcare to as many individuals as possible in light of resource

35. Ironically, almost all of the provincial budget comes from payouts by the national
government. Only approximately 4% of provincial revenue is actually derived by the provincial
government itself. See CASSIEM & STREAK, supra note 13, at 66-67.
36. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC)
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limitations. 37 Thus, because the hospital's scheme to limit treatment to
those who could be cured was rational, and because resources were "not
available," the Court denied plaintiffs petition. In the words of Judge
Sachs:
[t]he literal provision of equal access to high technology care,
utilized most often by the elderly would inevitably raise the level of
spending to a point which would preclude investment in preventive
care for the young and maintenance care for working adults. That
is why most national health systems do not offer, or severely ration
(under a variety of disguises), expensive technological care such as
renal dialysis or organ transplants. 8
The Court's reasoning that granting access to dialysis would require the
courts to grant the same remedy to all other similarly situated South
Africans drove the final nail in the coffin of the plaintiff's claim for a
direct entitlement to medical services upon demand.39
In conclusion, despite the various standards laid forth in Soobramoney,
the Court ultimately did nothing more than examine the resources
allocated by the government for a specific socio-economic right when
attempting to ascertain what resources are "available."
B. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom
1. Background
In its second socio-economic rights case, the Constitutional Court
considered a claim brought under section 26 (right to housing) and section
28 (rights of children). The parties seeking relief had squatted on privately
owned land, and were subsequently evicted.' They filed suit arguing that

37. See Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 19.
38. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 765 53.
39. See id. 28. This approach is rather weakly reasoned. This finding fails to consider the
fact that the service need not be extended to all similarly situated people. Instead, the service could
simply be proportionally extended to more people than it was previously being afforded to. Ifeven
only a few more physical, financial, or other resources were available, some of these resources (but
not necessarily all) could be used to assist some of those in the applicant's position without
necessarily having to extend it to all others in his position. See id.
40. The manner in which the plaintiffs were evicted from the land was especially inhumane.
In its final judgment, the Grootboom court also found that the manner in which they were evicted
may have also violated the Constitution because it infringed upon the negative right to respect the
right to housing under section 26(1). See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 6 (Bill of Rights) § 26. However,
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the state was obligated to provide them with temporary shelter or housing
until they were able to obtain permanent accommodation. While they
based their claim initially on the unqualified right of children to shelter
under section 28(l)(b), amici submitted by the South African Human
Rights Commission and the Community Law Centre broadened the claim
to a general right to housing under section 26."'
In Grootboom, the Court replaced its previous rationality review with
its present reasonable national plan standard. This drastic switch was an
important fundamental step in laying out and articulating South Africa's
young socio-economic rights jurisprudence. Instead of merely needing to
be found rational, the state's actions in fulfilling its positive socioeconomic rights obligations instead need to pass a higher reasonableness
standard.42
In determining whether the measures were reasonable, the Court laid
out a detailed list of standards and requirements that must be fulfilled for
the natural program to be considered to be reasonable.43 The Court
determined that the unqualified right of children to housing under section
28(l)(c) did not apply to children still in their parent's care and was
therefore not violated in the case before it.' However, the Court did find
that although the provincial government had implemented a reasonable
housing plan subsequent to the initiation of litigation, the national program
failed in its obligation to fulfill the rights enshrined in section 26. The
Court found that because the national government had made no provision
in its housing plan for those in most desperate need and requiring

a violation of the negative right to housing was not argued at trial by plaintiffs, and were therefore
not ruled upon by the Court.
41. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 6 (Bill of Rights) § 28(1)(b) ("Every child has the right...
to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services."); see also Liebenberg,
supra note 28, at 20.
42. "The standard of review applied by the Constitutional Court in this case is more
substantive and less deferential to the State than the 'rationality' standard adopted in the
Soobramoney case."
43. See Gov 't of the Republic of S. Aft. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC)
39-44.
44. The specific constitutional rights of children, including the socio-economic rights to
"basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services" enshrined in section 28, do
not have the internal "available resources" limitation that applies to sections 26 and 27. Because
these socio-economic rights are unqualified, plaintiff families had hoped that the Constitutional
Court would uphold the High Court's ruling that this unqualified section 28 claim entitled the entire
family to immediate relief based on their ties to the children. However, the Constitutional Court
found that the unqualified socio-economic rights of children can only be directly claimed when they
are no longer under their parent's care. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft. & Others v Grootboom
& Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 77.
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immediate assistance, its plan did not meet the reasonableness
requirements of section 26.
2. Available Resources Jurisprudence
Grootboom is the landmark socio-economics rights case that
comprehensively defined the context of the government's socio-economic
rights obligations and the available resources question. The Constitutional
Court directly addresses the question of "available resources" in a single
paragraph, the language of which, at first glance, seems to bind the content
of socio-economic rights within the available resources limitation.
However, additional sections of the judgment indirectly define and shape
the context of the available resources limitation.46 Indeed, a close reading
of Grootboom suggests that the judgment does not in fact severely limit
socio-economic rights by way of the available resources limitation.
a. Fundamental Principles and Available Resources4 7
Perhaps Grootboom'smost important change from Soobramoneyis the
larger implications of the judgment's only paragraph addressing directly
the available resources limitation: "The content of the obligation in
relation to the rate at which it is achieved as well as the reasonableness of
the measures employed to achieve the result are governed by the
availabilityof resources.'' 48 It is the specificity of this language that is a
change from Soobramoney, in which the Court did not discuss the
relationshipsbetween the "content of the obligation," "the rate at which

45. See id. 63 ("It is common cause that, except for the Cape Metro Land Programme, there
is no provision in the nationwide housing programme as applied within the Cape Metro for people
in desperate need."); id. 99.
As at the date of the launch of this application, the state housing programme in the
area of the Cape Metropolitan Council fell short of compliance with the
requirements in paragraph (b) in that it failed to make reasonable provisions
within its available resources for people in the Cape Mountain who are with no
access to land, have no roof over their heads, and who were living in intolerable
conditions or crisis situations.
Id.
46. See id. 46.
47. The conclusions in this part are based on the interpretation of the section titled "Within
Available Resources" which is the only section to directly address the available resources limitation
in isolation from other issues.
48. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 46 (emphasis added).
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result] is achieved," "reasonableness," and the "availability of
[the desired
' 49
resources.
While helpful, the Court's more comprehensive approach ultimately
leaves more questions open than it answers. The above quoted language
could intend two different implications for the content of socio-economic
rights.50 Employing one approach, the "content of the obligation" remains
permanently constant, while all that changes with available resources is the
state's obligation as to the rate at which the right must be realized. 5 '
Alternatively, the language can be read to mean that the actual content of
the rights themselves change depending upon resource availability. These
interpretations implicate different processes; however, it is not clear
whether this observation is a distinction without a difference, especially
when considering that the substantive outcome may be the same in each
case.
Regarding the effects of this language on the question of
reasonableness, a textual analysis of the Court's language reveals three
possible interpretations. The first and most straightforward interpretation
is that the available resources restriction is simply read into the
reasonableness requirement. This first approach would require looking at
resources once when reviewing reasonableness. In other words, a major
factor in determining 52what is reasonable will be whether there were
"available resources."
A second interpretation mandates that courts consider available
resources in two different contexts. In this approach, available resources
would remain a major factor in determining the reasonableness of the
measures (based on the above language from Grootboom). However, the
court would then reapply the available resources limitation a second time
based upon the independent application of the available resources
limitation as its own variable.5 3 Thus, the first step is determining what is
reasonable (a question greatly informed by available resources), and the

49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Anja Snellman, The Development of a Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence
in South Africa, at 22, available at http://www.afrikagrupperna.se/usrd/agm488.pdf (citing
Liebenberg, supra note 28) ("This means that the availability of resources will be an important
factor for the Court in determining what is reasonable. However, the Court did not indicate how
it would assess the availability of resources and whether it will be willing to review the
reasonableness of budgetary allocations."); Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 20.
51. For an example of this interpretation, see, e.g., Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic
Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitations Clauses, 20 SAJHR (2004), available at
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/sajhr/2004/iles.pdf.
52. See, e.g., Liebenberg, supranote 28, at 20.
53. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 46.
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second step is determining, once the reasonableness of the measures is
established, whether those measures are being taken within "available
resources?" 54 Although the court would use the same criteria in both
applications of the available resources limitations, this two-pronged
approach could create a weaker right than that created by the first approach
because it applies the available resources limitation twice and, therefore,
limits the right twice.
A third approach is an offshoot of the second approach. Using this
approach, a court examines and applies the available resources question
differently at each stage of the two-pronged approach. A court applies the
limitation to reasonableness, and then examines the available resources
question as an independent limitation with distinct criteria, thereby going
through a distinct analysis. In these distinct analyses, the effects of
available resources may be interpreted using different criteria, but so too
might the method of determining what resources are actually "available."
These three approaches might mean very different things for socioeconomic rights in South Africa, but as of yet, no approach can be
proclaimed the uncontested victor based on the Court's judgments to date.
In comparing other aspects of Grootboom to Soobramoney, there are
additional divergences between the two cases. The first of these is a
change in word choice. The Court in Grootboom replaces the word
"limited," used in Soobramoney to describe the effect available resources
has upon 55
the content of socio-economic rights, with the word
"governed." An open question remains as to whether using the word
"governed" in place of the word "limited" is a distinction without a
difference or an affirmative change from Soobramoneyf 6 However, the
54. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures (a question independently
requiring an analysis of available resources), within its available resources (an independent
question posed a second time), to achieve the progressive realization of this right.
55. Compare Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 T 11
("What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations imposed on the state by sections
26 and 27 in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent
upon the resources availablefor such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are
limited by reason of the lack of resources.) (emphasis added), with Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) 46 ("The content of the obligation in relation to the rate at which [the desired result
was] achieved as well as the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the result [were]
governed by the availabilityof resources."). A distinction can however be made that Soobramoney
does not comment in the same manner on the content of the right in relation to achieving the result,
and for this reason could be distinguished. It should also be noted that Grootboom does quote the
word "limited" from Soobramoney. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 46.
56. An open question remains whether if the Grootboom court had been required to rely
solely on the judgment from Soobramoney to reach its decision, and therefore been required to
apply only the word "limited," would the outcome in Grootboom have been different as a result?
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simple fact that the Court did not choose to use the same word suggests
that the change is significant.57
At first, the term "governed" seems to imply that resource availability
entirely defines (as opposed to merely limiting) the rate of achievement
and what the Court will consider reasonable. However, the judgment's
subsequent language, which qualifies available resources as "an important
factor" but not the only factor in determining reasonableness, clarifies the
level of influence that the word governed has. The Court states: There is
a balance between goals and means. "The measures must be calculatedto
attain the goal expeditiously and effectively but the availability
5 8 of
reasonable.
is
what
determining
in
factor
resources is an important
The above quoted language raises two questions whose answers further
define the available resources limitation. First, what does the phrase,
"measures... calculatedto attain the goal expeditiously and effectively,"
means for available resources?59 The phrase could imply that the
requirement can be met in the formulation of the measures (their
calculation) and does not reference an evaluation of the effects of these
measures, that is, outputs. However, in order to be calculated to attain the
goal, it would be unreasonable to ignore the effects from the previous year.
Measures which failed to expeditiously and effectively give effect to the
right the previous year within available resources, which are then simply
robotically repeated despite this failure, cannot be said to be "well
calculated," and, as a result, may fail to meet the requirements of this
language.
Second, what is the distinction between available resources and
allocated resources? This question is indeed the focus of this Article. In
addition to the observation that available resources are not the only factors
in determining reasonableness, the Court's language references the
"availability of resources" and not the amount of allocated resources.
Although the Court previously stated that it "will be slow to interfere with
rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs . . ." an

integrated reading of the Court's judgment suggests the Court's scrutiny

It should be noted that the Grootboomcourt still quoted language from Soobramoneythat included
the word limited. Id.
57. The strongest case for an opposite finding is the fact that a quoted portion of
Soobramoney in Grootboom includes the word "limited," despite Grootboom's definite word choice
change. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 46.
58. Id. 47 (emphasis added).
59. Id.(emphasis added). The other possible implications of this language will be addressed
during Part III of this Article.
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is not limited to allocated resources.' A rational reading maintains that the
reasonableness standard of review takes into account the general
availability of resources in the national, provincial and local contexts.6 '
Taking this approach would not on its face inherently impinge upon the
separation of powers since the Court has previously found that when
enforcing the Constitution, potential "intrusions" on another branch of
government are in some cases mandated by the Constitution itself.62 When
reviewing the availability of national resources, there are vastly different
scopes of review, some of which might violate the separation of powers
and some of which the Constitution's guarantee of socio-economic rights
arguably mandates. What is clear, however, is that in light of the Court's
own representations regarding the separation of powers, the current
approach does not constitute a violation by any stretch of the imagination.
In fact, the Court arguably has a great deal of room within which it can
expand its inquiry before this concern becomes a significant problem.
While Grootboom can be read as limiting the available resources
question to no more than a question of budgeted allocation, such a reading
is not in harmony with the rest of Grootboom'srequirements regarding the
reasonableness test.

60. See Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 765 29. For a similar suggestion regarding allocation,
see Liebenberg, supranote 28, at 20.
61. See Snellman, supra note 50, at 29-30.
62. Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) 98.
This court has made it clear on more than one occasion that although there are no
bright lines that separate the roles of the legislature, the executive, and the courts
from one another, there are certain matters that are pre-eminently within the
domain of one or other of the arms of government and not the others. All arms of
government should be sensitive to and respect this separation. This does not mean,
however that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an impact on
policy. The primary duty of the Courts is to the Constitution and the law, "which
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or predujice." The
Constitution requires the state to "respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the right
in the Bill of Rights." Where state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the
Constitution, courts have to consider whether in formulating and implementing
such policy the State has given effect to its constitutional obligations. If it should
hold in any given case that the State has failed to do so, it is obliged by the
Constitution to say so. In sofar as that constitutes an intrusion into the domain of
the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself
Id. (emphasis added).
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b. Reasonableness and Available Resources63
An alternative reading of Grootboom must highlight the Court's
additional findings regarding the reasonableness standard of review, each
of which will be addressed separately below. In the section of the
judgment that describes the obligations imposed by the constitutional
requirement that the state must employ "reasonable legislative and other
measures," the Court in Grootboom lays out three specific reasonableness
prerequisites relevant to the question of available resources:'
1. "[The] national government bears an important responsibility in
relation to the allocation of national revenue to the provinces and local
government on an equitable basis";65 and
2. "[The national government must] ensure that the appropriate financial
and human resources are available";66 and
3. "The programme must also be reasonably implemented. An otherwise
reasonable programme that is not implemented reasonably will not
constitute compliance with the state's obligations. . . . Effective
implementation requires
at least adequate budgetary support by
67
national government.
The following part addresses in turn the implications of each of these
requirements.
(1) The National Government Must Allocate National Revenue to the
Provinces and Local Government on an Equitable Basis
Regarding this first reasonableness requirement, the Court held: "It
should be emphasized that national government bears an important
responsibility in relation to the allocation of national revenue to the
provinces and local government on an equitable basis.,68 Although the
Court has not more specifically interpreted this holding, the language
arguably obligates that the government's scheme of calculating funding for
the provinces be rational, implying a requirement that the state not unfairly

63. The conclusions of this part are derived solely on the basis of the section of the judgment
with the heading of "Reasonable Legislative and Other Measures." See Grootboom, 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) 39-45.
64. See id.
65. Id. 40 (citing S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 214).
66. Id. 39.
67. Id. 42, 68.
68. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 40.
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discriminate and that the program is fundamentally founded in fairness.6 9
Simply put, the national government cannot favor unjustifiably any
province. At the same time, this standard leaves open differentiation in
funding based on justifiable criteria, such as the various poverty indexes
used by the state. These criteria may, furthermore, be based on the concept
of substantive equality as opposed to a concept of procedural equality
based on uniform treatment.7 °
(2) Must Ensure that the Appropriate Financial and Human Resources
are Available
As to the second requirement, the Court held:
In the case of housing, it is a function shared by both national and
provincial government. Local governments have an important
obligation to ensure that services are provided in a sustainable
manner to the communities they govern. A reasonable program
therefore must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to the

69. See also S.

AFR.

CONST. ch. 13.

[General Financial Matters,] (2) The Act referred to in subsection (1) may be
enacted only after the provincial governments, organised local government and the
Financial and Fiscal Commission have been consulted, and any recommendations
of the Commission have been considered, and must take into account a) the
national interest b) any provision that must be made in respect of the national debt
and other national obligations c) the needs and interests of the national
government, determined by objective criteria; (d) the need to ensure that the
provinces and municipalities are able to provide basic services and perform the
functions allocated to them; National sources of provincial and local government
funding 227. (1) Local government and each province a) is entitled to an equitable
share of revenue raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and
perform the functions allocated to it; and b) may receive other allocations from
national government revenue, either conditionally or unconditionally. (2)
Additional revenue raised by provinces or municipalities may not be deducted
from their share of revenue raised nationally, or from other allocations made to
them out of national government revenue. Equally, there is no obligation on the
national government to compensate provinces or municipalities that do not raise
revenue commensurate with their fiscal capacity and tax base.
Id.
70. See City Council of Pretoriav J Walker, CCT 8/97; see also infra text accompanying
note 71; see also Justice Kate O'Regan, Prestige Lecture on Equality at University of Stellenbosch:
Substantive Equality in South Africa: The Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and the
Challenges that Lie Ahead (Aug. 4,2004), availableathttp://law.sun.ac.za/FacultyNews2004.htm.
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different spheres of government and ensure that the appropriate
financialand human resources are available.7 1
The Court has not addressed the implications of this requirement, nor has
the Court used the implications as the basis of a socio-economic rights
claim in South Africa. Ensuring that the appropriate financial and human
resources are available could either enlarge or reduce the strength of the
right. Either the "appropriate financial and human resources" could be
required for whatever plan had been found reasonable, or the plan could
be required to be formulated and based on the independently determined
amount that would constitute the "appropriate financial and human
resources." Yet another approach would require that appropriate
resources, which would "ensure that services are provided in a sustainable
manner . . ." be made available and determined as an independent
question.7 2 Following this third approach, only after the question of
"sustainable service provision" is determined and funding based on this
finding was set would a "reasonable plan" be formulated and essentially
made to fit within the confines of this funding.
Although, a determination of the "appropriate financial and human
resources" could be either based on the pre-formulated plan, or could be
a separate independent question. The former seems correct when read with
the Court's previous finding: "the content of the obligation in relation to
the rate at which it is achieved, as well as the reasonableness of the
measures employed to achieve the result were governed by the availability
of resources., 73 Moreover, the latter leaves open the seemingly
unanswerable question of what besides the pre-formulated plan could
define what "sustainable service provision" requires besides the rejected
minimum core.74 The answer to this question is commonsense. In light of
the larger context of the paragraph from which it was derived, the most
coherent meaning of the phrase, "ensure that the appropriate financial and
human resources are available," is that in order to be a well-coordinated
plan that would pass a reasonableness review, the state cannot blame the
difficulties of inter-governmental resource provision between national,
provincial and local governments for its failure to actualize a national plan.
This language appears to require that there is financial and resource

71. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 39 (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. Id. 46.
74. As will be discussed later within this part, the Grootboom court rejected the concept of
the minimum core offered by General Comment 3 on the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.
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cooperation between the three levels of government that must be present
in order for a plan to pass the test of reasonableness.
(3) The Programme Must Also be Reasonably Implemented
Regarding the third requirement of reasonableness, the Court states:
The formulation of a programme is only the first stage in meeting
the State's obligations. The programme must also be reasonably
implemented. An otherwise reasonable programme that is not
implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with the
state's obligations .... Effective implementation requires at least
adequate budgetary support by nationalgovernment.75
The Court has not yet defined what adequate budgetary support requires
of the state, nor has it given further indication of how it will determine
what reasonable implementation is. This portion of the judgment appears
to serve a similar function as the previous one. It requires that part of the
evaluation of reasonableness be the efficient and consistent financial
support for the agreed upon national plan throughout the course of its
implementation. While the previous requirement of "appropriate financial
and human resources" was tied to the challenges of the intergovernmental
coordination resource provision between national, provincial and local
governments, this requirement of "adequate budgetary support" appears
to be linked to the potential budgetary pitfalls of actually implementing a
conceptual plan. "Adequate budgetary support" seems to mean that once
a reasonable national plan has been chosen, the state has an obligation to
continuously financially support the project throughout its implementation.
This requirement would prevent the state from choosing a reasonable
national program, and then ex-post omitting sustainable, consistent
provision of the resources needed to implement the plan to each sphere of
government and department as originally conceived.
Although the previously discussed phrases are important pieces of the
Court's treatment of reasonableness in the context of "resources," there are
additional important aspects to be considered. In the same section of the
judgment in which the Court directly addresses "reasonableness," the
Court also reaches more generalized holdings. In more generally
describing its methodology for evaluating reasonableness, the Court
described how it would approach the question of available resources: "A
court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether one or more

75. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
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desirable or favorable measures could have been adopted, or whether
public money could have been better spent. ' , 76 In framing the inquiry in
this manner, the Court in Grootboom reaffirmed the deference to
governmental choices initially articulated in Soobramoney." The Court in
Grootboom found that its role is not to closely critique "whether more
desirable or favorable measures could have been adopted, or to determine
that public funds could have been better spent," but to focus on whether
the measures taken passed the reasonableness standard. The Court
additionally held:
The question will be whether the legislative and other measures
taken by the state are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a
wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to
meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of
reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this
requirement is met.78
These sections should not be read to hold that the Court has no
authority to evaluate the spending of public monies. The Court here flags
that it will not determine whether money could have been "better spent."
At the same time, progressive realization requires that measures be
expeditious and effective. Moreover, these measures must be implemented
reasonably. Based on these two requirements, this deferential section
should not be confused with prohibiting all inquiries into how public
monies are spent. When these contrasting and overlapping requirements
are read together, a standard should emerge that will not loosely or
generally allow courts to determine specifically how money could have
been better spent, but does allow the courts to examine the reasonableness,
expeditiousness, and effectiveness of those resources that were allocated
and made available to the program.79 Similarly, the prohibition against
declaring that public funds could have been better spent should not
prohibit an inquiry into whether money that had been allocated to be spent
on a certain right was actually spent on it and whether this money was
used in a manifestly wasteful manner.80

76. Id. 41.
77. See id.; Soobramoney v MinisterofHealth,KwaZulu-Natal1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
78. Grootboom, 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 41.
79. For a similar conclusion, see Liebenberg, supranote 28, at 20.
80. See id.An inquiry into whether something could have been "better spent" is different than
"wasteful." A question of how something could be better spent will encompass a range of choices
and programs. In contrast, when something can objectively be found wasteful, it is clearly not
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c. Progressive Realization and Available Resources 8
Just as it did in the case of "available resources" and the Court
similarly dedicates a paragraph to the explicit consideration of the
principle of "progressive realization."82 The focus of this paragraph was
a discussion of the rejection or acceptance of the definition of progressive
realization proscribed in international law by the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and General Comment 3.
Although "the court rejected the General Comment's requirement of a
minimum core obligation," the Court did adopt the definition of
progressive realization described in General Comment 3 of the Committee
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.83 Based on this General
within this range. Wasteful spending and implementation would be spending that was simply
inefficient, whatever the chosen program was. The requirement of progressive realization that the
progress towards the goal be expeditious and effective provide a strong basis to argue that at least
manifestly wasteful programs are violative of the requirements of the constitution. See CASSIEM
& STREAK, supra note 13.
81. The conclusions of this part are based on the section of the judgment that was explicitly
dedicated to consideration of the concept of progressive realization, see Grootboom, 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) 45.
82. See id. 45, 46.
83. See U.N. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 9 General
Comment 3, The nature of states parties obligation (art. 2, 1, 5th Sess., 1990) [hereinafter ESCR
COMM.].
Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively,
is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the
obligation of all meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility
device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for
any country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On
the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed
the raison d'tre, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States
parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes
an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that
goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would
require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the
context of the full use of the maximum available resources.
Id.; see also Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 26 ("The relevant international law can be
a guide to interpretation but the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of
international law will vary. However, where the relevant principle of international law binds South
Africa, it may be directly applicable."); id. 45 ("The meaning ascribed to [progressive realization]
is in harmony with the context in which the phrase is used in our Constitution and there is no reason
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Comment 3 definition of progressive realization, the Court further
develops the requirements of progressive realization in the context of
South Africa's courts by stating that to meet its obligations to "achieve the
progressive realization of [socio-economic rights]" requires the state to
meet four obligations relevant to the available resources limitation. Each
is examined in turn below:
1. To examine and where possible lower legal, administrative,
operational, andfinancialhurdles to accessibility.
2. Move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the
realization of the right.
3. To fully justify all deliberately retrogressive measures as to socioeconomic rights by reference to the totality of the rights in the
Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and in the context
of the full use of the maximum available resources.
4. Housing must be made more accessible not only to a largernumber of
people but to a wider range of people as time progresses.84
(1) To Examine and Where Possible Lower Legal, Administrative,
Operational, and Financial Hurdles to Accessibility
A drastic departure from the Soobramoney decision was Grootboom's
definition of progressive realization. One of the relevant ramifications of
this development was the inclusion of a requirement to lower hurdles to
accessibility.85 The Court outlines that the requirement of accessibility
should be progressively facilitated: "[Progressive realization] means that
accessibility should be progressively facilitated: legal, administrative,
operational andfinancialhurdlesshould be examined and, where possible,
lowered over time."86 The obligation enumerated by the Court notably
includes "financial hurdles." The obligations here should be two-fold.

not to accept that it bears the same meaning in the Constitution as in the document from which it
was so clearly derived.").
84. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 45 (emphasis added).
85. The requirements of accessibility have been commented on previously by experts in the
field. Liebenberg has stated that "[g]ovemment's progress in dismantling the range of obstacles that
impede access to socio-economic rights will be a factor in assessing the reasonableness of its
programmes." Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Human Dignity in InterpretingSocio-Economic
Rights, 21 SAJHR 33-42 (2005).
86. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 45 (emphasis added).
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Firstly, when able, government should examine, identify, and attempt to
overcome financial hurdles. While the word "should" is used instead of
"shall," as is used in other sections, cases in which such examinations are
"manifestly easy" to accomplish but not taken may constitute a violation
87
of the obligations required by the progressive realization requirement.
Examination of financial hurdles clearly consists of their identification, but
should additionally include an attempt to fully understand (examine) the
source of the difficulty. Complimentarily, the Court found that "where
possible" financial hurdles should be lowered over time. While this
obligation is also described by the word "should" and not "shall," the word
"should" still requires something on the part of the government. 8 Again,
a way to give definition to the use of the phrase "should be lowered over
time" may be that when a "hurdle" is "manifestly" easy to lower, or not
doing so would constitute "bad faith" on the part of the state, such actions
become requirements. 89 The greatest challenge of making an
"inefficiency" based claim against the state would be the ability to prove
that lowering these hurdles was not impossible (or was possible), a task the
difficulty of which will differ from case to case. 9°
This potential obligation would be no small matter in South Africa,
where the inefficiency of the bureaucratic systems responsible for the
administration of these programs is almost universal. 91 In the great
majority of cases, this inefficiency could provide the basis for finding a
program to be unreasonable and not in compliance with the requirement
of progressive realization. Such cases would likely include an obligation
to reduce gross corruption where doing so is "possible. 92 The
unemployment problem facing the South African government provides a
poignant example of the possible implications of such an interpretation.
The phrase, "where possible," cannot logically exclude South Africa,
where there is an approximately forty percent unofficial unemployment

87. See Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 20.
88. If the inclusion of a requirement described by the word engendered no further obligation
on the government than if it were not included at all, there would have been no reason to even state
the obligation.
89. For a similar argument in relation to the direct question of allocation and available
resources in Grootboom, see Liebenberg, supranote 28, at 20.
90. An interesting question here is also which party would bear the burden of proof in this
case. Also what criteria would a court examine, or would it be done on a case by case basis. For a
preliminary discussion of the requirement of efficiency, see CASsEM & STREAK, supra note 13, at
66-67.
91. See Sandra Liebenberg, The Right to Social Assistance: The Implicationsof Grootboom
for Policy Reform in South Africa, 17 SAJHR 243-46 (2001).
92. See CASSIEM & STREAK, supra note 13, at 66-67.
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rate and a resulting abundance of skilled workers available to replace the
corrupt individuals responsible for inefficiency.93 In cases where corrupt
individuals are identified, there is not simply a moral obligation to remove
them, but where such removal is "possible" as it certainly is within the
context of South Africa, there may be a potential constitutional obligation.
The Court has yet to define specifically what the term "financial hurdles"
may additionally include. Likely, additional candidates could rationally
include situations in which there exists a manifestly low tax rate and an
unwillingness to meet the norm of taxation of similarly situated
countries.94
(2) Move as Expeditiously and Effectively as Possible Towards The
Realization of the Right
The Court also required that in complying with the requirement of
progressive realization, the state has an obligation to move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards this goal. "[Progressive
realization] thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and
effectively as possible towards that goal." 95 In applying this requirement
to the question of available resources, the Court held: "The measures must
be calculated to attain the goal expeditiously and effectively, but the
availability of resources is an importantfactor in determining what is
reasonable." 96
Like much of the previously addressed language, the Court has not
applied the requirement of expeditious and effective action in any
judgment to date. Still, this requirement implies that a number of manners
of implementation might fail such a requirement: extensive general waste,
corruption, mismanagement, non-expenditure of allocated resources,
perhaps even manifestly poor decision as to expenditure choices.9 7 Simply
put, the government is required to realize socio-economic rights within its
available resources in a manner that is not wasteful. This language does

93. See Global Poverty Research Group: Unemployment Race and Poverty in South Africa,
at http://www.gprg.org/themes/t2-inc-ineq-poor/unem/unem-pov.htm.
94. South Africa's tax scheme is arguably significantly lower than other similarly situated
countries.
95. Gov 't of the Republic of S. Aft. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169

(CC) 45.
96. Id. 46 (emphasis added).
97. An example of such a choice that might be incompatible with expeditious and effective
actions, might be the purchase of a personal jet for the Director of an Agency when such a purchase
would in no way contribute to the realization of the relevant socio-economic rights. See CASSIEM
& STREAK, supra note 13, at 6, 17.
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not speak to funding and allocation requirements, but (as some of the
requirements of reasonableness might also require) requires that once
financial and other resources have been allocated, these resources must be
put to expeditious and effective use. However, it should be clear that this
requirement is distinct from allowing the Court to mandate the way in
which money should have alternatively been spent.
(3) To Fully Justify all Deliberately Retrogressive Measures as to
Socio-Economic Rights by Reference to the Totality of the Rights in the
Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and in the Context
of the Full Use of the Maximum of Available Resources
Finally, the Court's endorsement of the General Comment 3 definition
of progressive realization included the concept of a higher standard for the
approval of "retrogressive measures": "Moreover, any deliberately
retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the
totalityof the rightsprovidedforin the Covenant andin the context of the
full use of the maximum of available resources."98 This portion of the
judgment regarding retrogressive measures is the single most powerful
finding relevant to the advancement of socio-economic rights.99 Although
much of the concerns regarding the available resources limitations clause
are valid, in practice these concerns are most pertinent to the adoption of
new constitutional socio-economic rights that are not protected by the
"retrogressive safeguard" provided by the Court.
The adoption of General Comment 3's holding as to retrogressive
measures serves as an incredibly strong safeguard for the current funding
levels of constitutionally enshrined socio-economic rights.'00 Fully
justifying retrogressive measures by reference to the "totality of the rights"

98. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 45 (emphasis added).
99. See also Liebenberg, supranote 28, at 24 ("The area ofretrogressive measures in relation
to socio-economic rights also has a large amount of untapped potential in our constitutional
jurisprudence on these rights.").
100. Seeid.
It suggests that the State is under a duty to justify any retrogressive measures that
undermine people's economic and social rights. Retrogressive measures that make
access to the rights more difficult should be subject to heightened scrutiny by the
courts. At the very least the state should be required to put in place alternative
programmes that guarantee an equivalent or improved level of enjoyment of the
rights.
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provided for in the Covenant requires that any reduction in existing
services must be justified in relation to the strengthening of support for a
different right in the Covenant (in this case the parallel to socio-economic
rights in the Constitution). For example, if social grant funding was
reduced, such reduction in funding could be justified in the context of all
the other socio-economic rights if this money was diverted to in order
support other socio-economic rights and in order to extend the right to a
greater range of people.
Justifying a retrogressive measure in "the totality of the rights provided
for in the covenant" is not enough. Deliberately retrogressive measures
must also be justified in the context of the full use of the "maximum of
available resources."'' This standard is distinct from that applied to the
requirements of sections 26 and 27, which require the state to take
reasonable legislative and other measures within "available resources.' ' 2
Despite the lack of Court guidance regarding the question of available
resources, it is clear that the standard of scrutiny, or at least the practical
approach of the Court, must be different when considering socio-economic
measures within the context of the "maximum of available resources."
Even assuming arguendothat it were simply the case (despite arguments
put forward in this Article) that an investigation based on the limitation of
"available resources" requires only an analysis of allocatedresources (at
the local, provincial, and national levels, respectively), it cannot be that an
analysis of retrogressive measures within the maximum of available
resources requires nothing more than the Court's previous allocative
approach to the resource limitation.
Finally, in adopting General Comment 3's definition of progressive
realization, the Court may have created yet a third standard of review for
socio-economic rights cases. The Court found that when taking deliberate
retrogressive measures, the "most careful consideration" is required. The
requirement of "the most careful consideration" may necessitate a
stronger, more rigorous standard than the reasonableness standard the
Court applies to non-retrogressive measures.0 3 The distinction here is that
determining whether something is reasonable does not necessarily require
the "most careful consideration." As a result, a strong argument exists that
in adopting General Comment 3, the Constitutional Court created a third
distinct standard of review that must be applied to the question of the
"totality of the right" in the Covenant as well as to the question of the

101. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2 (Bill of Rights) §§ 26-27.
102. See Darrel Moellendorf, Reasoning About Resources: Soobramoney and the Futureof
Socio-Economic Rights Claims, 14 SAJHR (1998).
103. See also Liebenberg, supra note 28.
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"maximum of available resources," that was more rigorous than
Soobramoney's rationality review and more rigorous than Grootboom's
reasonableness standard of review." ° Although it is unclear what
additional obligations this requires as compared to non-retrogressive
measures, it is almost certain that it would require more than has
previously been applied by the Court in any of its socio-economic rights
cases to date.
Regarding a related question, a distinguished commentator has found
that it is not clear whether a quality reduction in service unaccompanied
by nothing else would trigger a retrogressive measures analysis." 5 What
is clear is that to even arguably trigger the analysis regarding this question
and others, the retrogressive measures must necessarily be "deliberate."
This "deliberate" requirement creates complicated questions that the Court
will eventually have to face. Reductions in the quality of government
programs happen for reasons that are surely on a spectrum between the
purely deliberate and the purely accidental.1"6 A head administrator of a
responsible government agency may make an explicit public decision to
cutback service provisions. Alternatively, an administrator could by way
of a deliberate private omission achieve the same reduction in service.
Where "deliberate" measures begin and end is a complicated question that
will present the Court with a challenging question in the future.

104. See id.
105. See Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 20.
[R]etrogressive measures that reduce the number of people who have access to a
particular benefit, and arguably also those measures that diminish the quality or
level of benefit that people enjoy [may trigger a retrogression analysis]. An
example would be a measure that reduced the amount of the child support grant
or the eligible age cohort.
Id.
106. For example, the necessary support staffcould not be increased as the growth of the client
population required, or bureaucracy could be allowed to grow unchecked. Further along on this
spectrum is an instance when the quality of service provision does decrease for reasons not tied to
any affirmative action or omission on the part of the agency, but the agency is aware of the
reduction and nevertheless takes no action over a long period of time. Finally, at the opposite end
of the spectrum is a scenario in which the quality of service goes down, but the administrators are
not aware of the changes.
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(4) Housing Must be Made More Accessible Not Only to a Larger
Number of People but to a Wider Range of People as Time Progresses
The Court also directly addresses specific requirements as to whom
must be progressively benefited: "Housing must be made more accessible
not only to a largernumber of people but to a wider range of people as
time progresses."' 7 It is unclear how this requirement intersects with the
question of available resources. If available resources remains constant, it
does not diminish the requirement to progressively realize the socioeconomic right in question with these resources. Yet, arguably, not more
can be done if there are not increased resources. This language seems to
imply a requirement that even when resources are held constant, there is
an obligation to increase the "number" and "type" of people who benefit
from a comprehensive national program.
The number requirement faces a difficult challenge in the face of an
increasing housing backlog. At the current rate of housing development
the absolute number of people without homes is likely increasing even as
the housing programs are strengthened. This state of affairs may itself be
a violation of progressive realization, and as a result require a level of
funding and provision of resources for housing that will at the very least
decrease the absolute number of those in need of housing.
The "wider range" requirement also poses prickly problems. How does
one increase the range of people benefited? It seems to imply that just one
type of person cannot continuously be the focus of the state's efforts.
However, aside from a loose requirement to meet the immediate, mid-term
and long-term needs, there does not seem to be a rigid structure as to
whom the socio-economic rights program must widen its girth to include.
This question has not yet been answered by the Court.
d. General Provisions and Available Resources
One of the more interesting requirements laid out by the Court was the
finding that:
This in turn requires recognition of the obligation to meet
immediate needs in the nationwide housing programme.
Recognition of such needs in the nationwide housing programme
requires it to plan, budget and monitor the fulfilment of immediate
needs and the management of crises. This must ensure that a

107. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 45.
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significantnumber of desperatepeople in need are affordedrelief
though not all of them need receive it immediately.'18
This language raises many difficult questions. When has somebody been
afforded relief? Does relief occur when the plan is made, implemented, or
completed? At what exact point in time is a hungry or homeless person
actually afforded relief? How does the answer to this initial question
change with the caveat that relief does not need to happen immediately?
How can relief be afforded to a person over time if not simply through
having a plan that targets them, and as a result is this language repetitive
with the rest of the judgment? At the same time, affording a person relief
implies a definitive effect of some kind that is more than simply creating
a national plan that contemplates a person's plight. How many people are
a significant amount?
An interesting potentiality of the holding is that one could argue that
there is a requirement to provide enough budgetary support such that a
significant amount of people are afforded relief. The obligation to
"budget" for the "fulfillment of immediate need and the management of
crises" read with the obligation to ensure "afford relief' for a significant
number of desperate people," naturally implies an obligation to provide a
certain minimum level of resources. This reading could provide future
litigants an important basis on which to challenge underfunding for socioeconomic rights in the future.
An additional as yet under-investigated implication for the interplay
between available resources and socio-economic rights is the unqualified
obligation to protect children as required by section 28.19 The state has an
unqualified obligation to provide the legal and administrative
infrastructure necessary to protect children still in their parents' care. 11

108. Id. 68.
109. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 28.
110. CASSlEM & STREAK, supra note 13, at 66-67. The Constitutional Court determined that

the unqualified socio-economic rights enshrined in section 28 do not directly apply to children still
in their parents care. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 77.
The state thus incurs the obligation to provide shelter to those children, for
example, who are removed from their families. It follows that section 28(1)(c)
does not create any primary state obligation to provide shelter on demand to
parents and their children if children are being cared for by their parents or
families.
Id. However, the Grootboom court emphasized that this did not excuse the state of all responsibility
for assisting needy children still in their parent's care. See id. 78.
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Although the obligation to protect is classically considered a negative
right, as the Court describes the right it also imposes certain positive
obligations on the state:
In the first place, the state must provide the legal and administrative
infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are accorded the
protection contemplated by section 28. This obligation would
normally be fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement
mechanisms for the maintenance of children, their protection from
maltreatment, abuse neglect, or degradation and the prevention of
other forms of abuse mentioned in section 28.111
As a result, the state has an unqualified obligation to provide funding
for infrastructure and to enact enforcement mechanisms to protect
children. This unqualified obligation to protect is not subject to the internal
available resources. It should be a right, the fulfillment of which any
affected individual child could lodge a direct claim for a remedy, as is
available to those children "who are removed from their families" pursuant
to section 28.112
While the state could of course fulfill these positive obligations in a
variety of ways and to varying degrees of quality, what is clear is that they
cannot be created without resources. The absence of an available resources
limitation, or the qualification of progressive realization in section 28,
means that a results oriented analysis should be appropriate when
evaluating the sufficiency of these positive measures to protect children.
This outcome-based evaluation in turn should not allow consideration of
resources. However, even if the Court found that it implicitly required
such an analysis of resources, at the very least, the Court incurs an
obligation to launch a more rigorous inquiry into resources if the state

This does not mean, however, that the state incurs no obligation in relation to
children who are being cared for by their parents or families. In the first place, the
state must provide the legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure
that children are accorded the protection contemplated by section 28. This
obligation would normally be fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement
mechanisms for the maintenance of children, their protection from maltreatment,
abuse, neglect or degradation and the prevention of other forms of abuse of
children mentioned in section 28.
Id.
111. Grootboom,2000(11)BCLR 1169 (CC)
112. Id. 77.
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points to resource constraints as the basis of a failure to implement its
child protection procedures and apparatus.
A final issue of note in the Grootboom judgment is that for the first
time the Court observes that determining the fulfillment of socio-economic
right obligations implicates the right to dignity:
It is fundamental to an evaluation of the reasonableness of state
action that account be taken of the inherent dignity of human
beings. The Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its paper
if the reasonableness of State action concerned with housing is
determined without regard to the fundamental constitutionalvalue
of human dignity. 3
In short, the Court determined that this provision requires that
reasonableness be evaluated with particular regard to human dignity." 4
This requirement in turn requires that to the extent that available resources
informs reasonableness, dignity must also interact in some way with the
question of available resources. Because dignity in South Africa is a full
and justiciable right, its inclusion therefore requires something more than
would otherwise be required in relation to the intersection of available
resources and reasonableness." 5 Of course, it is unclear what exactly this
extra requirement is. The Court has yet to address this question." 6
In addition to its conclusion regarding the right to dignity, the Court in
Grootboom similarly addresses the fact that socio-economic rights are
interrelated and interdependent.
The right of access to adequate housing cannot be seen in isolation.
There is a close relationship between it and the other socioeconomic rights. Socio-economic rights must all be read together
in the setting of the Constitution as a whole . . . Their

113. See also id. 83 (emphasis added) ("The concept [of the interrelated nature of rights] has
immense human and practical significance in a society founded on human dignity, equality and
freedom."). See also id. ("Section 26 is not the only provision relevant to a decision as to whether
state action at any particular level of government is reasonable and consistent with the constitution.
The proposition that rights are interrelated and are all equally important is not merely a theoretical
postulate").
114. Id.; see also Khosa & Others v Minister of Soc. Dev. & Others, Mahlaule & Others v
Minister of Soc. Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 137; see also generally Liebenberg,
supra note 85.
115. See Liebenberg, supranote 85.
116. In fact the reliance on dignity to supplement and enforce other rights in South Africa has
been generally criticized by many commentators in South Africa. See generally id.
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interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in interpreting
the socio-economic rights, and, in particular, in determining
whether the State has met its obligations in terms of them.117
This statement is a more specific application of the previous holding in
Soobramoney that "rights by their very nature are shared and interdependent."" 8
Although the point has been previously alluded to, Grootboom does
represent a significant and undeniable setback for socio-economic rights.
The rejection of the International Covenant of Economic Social and
Cultural Rights' minimum core obligation took away what could have
been a backdoor around the available resources limitation of sections 26
and 27, at least for the most desperate in society." 9 The minimum core
would have required the state "to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights."' 120 In contrast to the
Court's holding regarding the Covenant, the Constitutional Court decided
not to adopt the concept of a minimum core obligation. The court made
this determination on the grounds that there was not a significant enough
congruence between the language of the Covenant and the South African
Constitution regarding the issue. 12' However, the Court in Grootboom
quite paradoxically held that although it was not a binding obligation, the
extent to which the minimum core obligation was being met might be a
relevant variable in considering the reasonableness of a national plan.' 22
3. The Court's Investigation of Resources: Application of Jurisprudence
Despite the Court's extensive comments on the resource-related
obligations that the Constitution puts upon the state, the Court does not do
much in applying these standards to the fact of the case. In evaluating the
National Housing Program, the Court observes:

117. Grootboom, 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 24.
118. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) 54.
119. See ESCR COMM., supra note 83, gen. cmt. 3.
120. Id. gen. cmt. 3, 10.
121. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 33 ("As will appear from the discussion
below, the real question in terms of our Constitution is whether the measures taken by the state to
realise the right afforded by section 26 are reasonable.").
122. Id. ("There may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the
content of a minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the state are
reasonable.").
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The nationwide housing programme falls short of its obligations
imposed upon national government to the extent that it fails to
recognise that the State must provide relief for those in desperate
need. [The most desperate] are not to be ignored in the interests of
an overall programme focused on medium and long-term
objectives. It is essential that a reasonablepart of the national
is for
housing budget be devoted to this, but the precise allocation
123
national government to decide in the first instance.
Even after finding a violation of the right to housing on the part of the
national government, the Constitutional Court in Grootboom did not
inquire into the question of the availability of resources as it did in
Soobramoney. Neither did the Court ultimately require an increase in the
overall resource allocation provided to the Department of Housing by the
government. In applying its standards to the case, all the Court required
was that, at the very least, a "reasonable" portion of the existing budget be
dedicated to the most needy.'24 When a governmental plan is found to have
ignored the short-term needs of the most needy, the remedy is not
necessarily increased funding, but instead a more equitable distribution of
resources between the short, medium, and long-term goals of a given
national plan.'25
Within this framework, an obligation to increase the overall amount of
allocated resources could exist. This obligation could potentially exist, as
diverting required resources from middle and long-term goals to
immediate short-term needs of the most desperate could reduce the
such that
effectiveness of the previous medium and long-term programs
26
they render the plans unreasonable as to those groups.'
For example, if in complying with the requirement to provide for the
most desperate, the state was forced to divert fifty percent of the funds
from mid-range efforts, these mid-range programs may be left with
inadequate funds. As previously mentioned, it is in a case like this where
there is a pre-existing program in operation and funding is in mid-stream
taken from a program that potentially violates the requirement of
"adequate budgetary support" for medium-range programs. 27 In such an

123. Id. 66 (emphasis added).
124. Id. 44, 56, 66.
125. Id. 43.
126. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 43 ("The programme must be balanced and
flexible and make appropriate provision for attention to housing crises and to short, medium and
long term needs.").
127. See id. 42, 68.
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instance, the mid-range plan may no longer pass a reasonableness review
because of the reasonable implementation requirement of "adequate
budgetary support."
Even if the changes in mid-range program funding were not substantial
enough to trigger the above stated results, the cutbacks in service for those
with medium-term needs may constitute deliberately retrogressive
measures and trigger a separate inquiry. Although the Court did not
discuss, and no subsequent party has brought suit regarding the issue of
whether the Grootboom ruling resulted in a retrogression of medium- and
long-range projects, and what legal effect it might have, a closer look at
the question reveals some interesting potentialities. The argument could
be put forth that the reallocation constituted a retrogression for those
individuals that were being targeted by the mid-range plan.
A retrogression resulting from a court imposed order to increase
funding to short-term projects to supply for the most desperate, which
results in significant funds being diverted from medium-projects, can
clearly (as required) be justified in the context of the "totality of the rights"
of the Covenant. However, if this retrogression were established, the court
would additionally have to evaluate it under the higher standard of the
"maximum of available resources" required by the adopted definition of
progressive realization. In this manner, a suit alleging that the national
plan ignored the interests of those in need of low, medium or long-term
projects could be used as a backdoor into the "maximum of available
resources standard." This approach could provide a convincing legal
argument supporting an obligation for the court to order an increase in
overall funding for the Department of Housing in order to comply with
both the obligation to support the most needy, but to additionally only
retrogress measures to mid-range or long-range programs in the context of
the "maximum of available resources."
In conclusion, although it only briefly deals directly with the question
of available resources, the Grootboomjudgment provides a large amount
of support for an expanded view of the available resources question.
C. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign
1. Background
Treatment Action Campaign involves a claim against the government
challenging the reasonableness of a governmental plan that restricted the
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provision of nevirpaine, a medication that could prevent mother-to-child
HIV transmission, to a small group of local experimental test sites, while
denying it to other state heath centers. The Constitutional Court found that
the restriction on the use of nevirparine to these few limited sights was
unreasonable in light of the fact that it was being offered to the South
African government free of charge by a pharmaceutical company. 128 The
Court solidly grounded its reasoning in the fact that the plan was
inherently "inflexible" and that it did not provide
services to an especially
29
vulnerable group of mothers and children.
2. Available Resources Jurisprudence
In this third socio-economic case put before the Constitutional Court,
the Court further refines the criteria that it is to apply to the question of
available resources. Addressing the extent of the courts' power of review
as to resources, the Court echoed its previous rulings and held:
Courts are ill-suited, to adjudicate upon issues where court orders
could have multiple social and economic consequences for the
community. The constitution contemplates rather a restrained and
focused role for the courts, namely, to require the state to take
measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. 30
This sentiment is not new to the Court's analysis. As held previously in
Soobramoney, a "court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions
taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose

128. Ministerof Health & Others v TreatmentAction Campaign& Others 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) 15. In addition, an interesting relevant distinction between two types of reasonableness
reviews come to light in this context. The first type is an objective reasonableness review. This type
of review requires a determination that the plan fits what can be termed the procedural requirements
of reasonableness. This requires a determination that for example that the plan is flexible, that there
is coordination between the three branches of government, and that the most desperate are given
a significant portion of attention. The second type is subjective reasonableness. When the Court
finds that a plan fails reasonableness review it sometimes is based on its own subjective valuation
of the plan, irrespective of whether it meets the generalized objective requirements of
reasonableness. Some may argue that it was also this subjective type of reasoning that informed the
decision in Treatment Action Campaign. The Court simply found the government's choice to be
unreasonable on its face, even if it had met the other generalized "procedural" requirements of
reasonableness. There may be a distinction regarding the scope of the Court's orders when its
decisions are based on either of these two types of reasonableness review.
129. Id. 78-79.
130. Id. 38.
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responsibility it is to deal with such matters."'' 3 ' The Court further held:
"Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary
implications, but are not in themselves directedat rearrangingbudgets.
In this way the judicial, legislative, and executive functions achieve an
appropriate constitutional balance.' l 2
This new distinction is an important one. It implies that orders may
have cost implications for government that will affect its budgets, but that
court orders cannot themselves directly say, in advance of the court
mandated modifications, specifically how much money should be
designated to which aspect of the budget. Treatment Action Campaign's
holding is of course similar to that of Soobramoney, but is slightly more
specific in its articulation. 3 3 A way of looking at this requirement is that
a court can only indirectly require that more resources be given to fulfill
its order by saying broadly that "more" is needed to satisfy a
reasonableness review. Creating these required reasonable measures will
sometimes require more money (budgetary implications), but cannot
directly say the amount34of money that must be given to address this issue
(rearranging budgets). 1

An issue relevant to Soobramoney's holdings that this additional
language brings further into focus is up to what level does this rule of the
"re-arrangement" of budgets apply?13 5 The national government has
budgets, as does the provincial government, as does the municipal and
local governments, as does each department in each of these, as does each
project or program directed by each department. It is unclear whether the
prohibition on the rearrangement of budgets extends to the smallest36
political units and to project budgets within these specific departments. 1
In addition, upon closer examination, it is hard to distinguish truly
between these two propositions. Something that has budgetary
implications will ultimately, inevitably require budgetary rearrangement,
at least to some degree. Likewise, any rearrangement of budgets will in
turn have budgetary implications. One approach is explicit and specific,
the other indirect and general, but in many ways they are two different
means of arriving at the same end.

131. Soobramoney v Minister ofHealth,KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) 29.
132. TreatmentAction Campaign,2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 38 (emphasis added).
133. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 765 29.
134. However, an obligation to not directly attempt to rearrange budgets does not necessarily
logically remove the duty of a court to mandate limited amounts of additional funding based on a
reasonableness review. See Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 20.
135. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 765 129; see Snellman, supra note 50, at 29-30.
136. See Sneilman, supranote 50, at 29-30.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

43

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNA TIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

In a different arena, the Court also reinforced its rejection of the
minimum core in Grootboom:
It should be borne in mind that in dealing with such matters the
courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging
factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what the
minimum-core standards called for by the first and second amici
should be, nor for deciding how public revenues should most
effectively be spent. There are many pressing demands on the public
purse. 37
'
While many of the implications of this language are obvious, what is most
important to note is that it creates a potential direct conflict in reasoning
with the Grootboom'sadoption of the Committee of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights' definition of progressive realization, which imposes "an
obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible."' 38
Moving "effectively" towards a goal may conflict directly with a
prohibition on consideration of the "effective" use of funds. It is unclear
how these two different "effectiveness" requirements might interact if
litigation put them directly at odds.
The Court not only claims it is not capable of determining what the
minimum core is, it also claims that the actual realization of the minimum
core is "impossible." "It is impossible to give everyone access even to a
core service immediately. All that is possible and all that can expected of
the State, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic
rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis."139 This
statement is most unfortunate. The assertion cannot be squared with the
Court's conclusion that it is not qualified to determine what the minimum
core would consist of or its conclusion that it would need additional
information. If a court is not equipped to determine what something would
be, it can hardly then claim to know only that whatever this minimum core
would be, it is impossible to provide. This statement is the single most
important logical shortcoming of the current socio-economic rights
jurisprudence.
Moving forward to a different part of the Treatment Action Campaign
judgment, the Court engages in a comprehensive discussion regarding the

137. TreatmentAction Campaign,2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 37 (emphasis added).
138. Gov 't of the Republic of S. Aft. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) 45.
139. Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR
1075 (CC)
99-114 (emphasis added).
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issue of separation of powers.' 40 Many of the most fervent critics of
constitutional socio-economic rights have pointed to the "danger" that they
pose for the maintenance of separation of powers. The Court in Treatment
Action Campaign addressed more directly the separation of powers issue
than had previous cases and determined that the obligations of the
constitution may simply trump deference to these concerns in some cases:
Where state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the
Constitution, courts have to consider whether in formulating and
implementing such policy the state has given effect to its
constitutional obligations. If it should hold in any given case that
the state has failed to do so, it is obliged by the constitution to say
so. In so far as that constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the
executive, that is an intrusionmandatedby the Constitutionitself 141
The Court also makes clear that this duty to the Constitution will not
limit the powers of the courts to declare and enforce orders regarding this
issue.
There is also no merit in the argument advanced on behalf of
government that a distinction should be drawn between declaratory
and mandatory order against government. Even simple declaratory
ordersagainstgovernment or organsofstate can affect theirpolicy
and may well have budgetary implications. Government is
constitutionally bound to give effect to such orders whether142or not
they affect its policy and has to find the resources to do so.

The most important aspect of these statements is that when the government
is ordered by a court to take action, it has to "find the resources to do
so.""143 While a windfall to proponents

of socio-economic

right

enforcement, and those like the author who worry that the available
resources limitation may eviscerate the substantive value of these rights if
incorrectly interpreted, the utility of even this statement is itself weakened
by this same resource limitation. Because the Court's decision-making is
itself already incredibly deferential to the available resources limitation,
the strong language regarding the court's orders and resources may be a

140. Soobramoney v Ministerof Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC)
114 (CC).
141. Id. 99 (emphasis added).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
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lame duck since the orders themselves are already largely decided by the
available resources limitation. At the same time, the finding that
government "has to find the resources to" comply with court orders
implies that there will be cases when the previously allocated resources are
not sufficient and indeed must be increased. Were this scenario not the
case, there would have been no need for this holding regarding resources
and court orders. In so doing, the Court has strongly implied that its
process of evaluating available resources is not merely limited to previous
government allocation. 44
Yet another groundbreaking aspect of Treatment Action Campaign is
the often overlooked requirement of transparency. The Court discusses the
concept of reasonableness in a way that has new implications for the
available resources question. In the last page of its judgment, the Court
inserted the new reasonableness requirement of transparency:
[A] concerted, co-ordinated, and co-operative national effort in
which government in each of its three spheres and the panopoly of
resources and skills of civil society are marshalled, inspired and led
• . . can be achieved only if there is proper communication,
especially by government. In order for it to be implemented
optimally, a public health programme must be made known
effectively to all concerned,down to the district nurse and patients.
Indeed, for a public programme such as this to meet the
constitutional requirement of reasonableness, its contents must be
45
made known appropriately.'

144. This observation is all the more important in light of the fact that the Treatment Action
Campaign court also emphasized that
If it is necessary to do so, the courts may even fashion new remedies to secure the
protection and enforcement of these all-important rights ... Particularly in a
country where so few have the means to enforce their rights through the courts,
it is essential that on those occasions when the legal process does establish that an
infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The
courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to "forge new
tools" and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal.
See TreatmentAction Campaign,2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 102 (citing Fose v Minister of Safety &
Sec. 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC)).
145. Treatment Action Campaign,2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 123 (emphasis added). A similar
issue is likewise to what extent funding must be provided for each of the different duties required
by the constitution: to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill. Must each of these duties be fulfilled
at the same level, or can doing more for one of the duties reduce the obligation as to another. Put
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An open question remains how this new transparency requirement
interacts with the available resources aspect of reasonableness review. Are
the funding requirements before and after this new transparency
requirement the same, or must all budgets and measures be enlarged to add
on new transparency programs following this decision? In the alternative,
because this new requirement has budgetary implications, if it does not
require the provision of additional resources to meet the new requirement,
when funds are diverted to communicate the programs it could effectively
reduce the actual service provision for all socio-economic rights relative
to the time period before Treatment Action Campaign was decided.'46
A final important issue that TreatmentAction Campaignbrings up will
be further discussed in Part IV. In its judgment, the Court explicitly turned
down an invitation to consider the argument put forward by the amici of
the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the Community Law
Centre. The amici contended that no-action by the state would incur
increasedfuture costs based on the continuing obligation under section 27
to care for children that would become infected with HIV as a result of the
refusal of the government to expand its experimental neviparine
program.'47 The unaddressed amici argument may be an important future
argument that will lead to a more helpful enforcement of the full range of
socio-economic rights.

differently, must the resource tide lift all boats (duties) equally, or can enormous support for the
duty to protect a given socio-economic right reduce the duty to fulfill?
146. However, such reduction might similarly have to be analyzed under the standard of
review for deliberatively retrogressive measures which would require it to pass the higher standard
of the "maximum of available resources." In addition, the author is not holding that the requirement
is not a well reasoned one. Citizens and permanent residents of South Africa can only benefit from
a required dissemination of information, and it will in the long run inevitably give more substantive
value to the right. The only point being made here is that the court should require increased funding
to meet the new reasonableness obligation that it included for the first time here.
147. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 116.
The question whether budgetary constraints provided a legitimate reason for not
implementing a comprehensive policy for the use ofnevirparine, including testing
and counselling, was disputed. It was contended that the use of the drug would
result in significant savings in later years because it would reduce the number of
HIV positive children who would otherwise have to be treated in the public health
system for all the complications.
Id. It is not necessary to deal with that issue as conditions have changed since these proceedings
were initiated. Id.
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3. The Court's Investigation of Resources: Application of Jurisprudence
Once the Court articulated these standards of available resources
jurisprudence, it then applied these new standards to the case. The Court
in practice took a similar approach to that taken in Soobramoney and
looked merely at the budget allocated to the right to health:
We were informed at the hearing of the appeal that the government
has made substantial additional funds available for the treatment of
HIV, including the reduction of mother-to-child transmission. The
total budget to be spent mainly through the Departmentsof Health,
SocialDevelopment andEducation was R350 million in 2001/2. It
has been increased to R1 billion in the current financialyear
[2002] andwillgo up to R1.8 billion in 2004/5. This means that the
budgetary constraints referred to in the affidavits are no longer an
impediment. With the additional funds that are now to be available,
it should be possible to address any problems of financial incapacity
that might previously have existed.'48
Because the government had dedicated millions more Rand to the
budgets of the relevant departments since the inception of the suit, the
Court did not need to address the initial available resources defense when
it examined the allocated money. However, the approach is distinct in that
the Court analyzed the allocated budgets of three different departments
(ostensibly because they all were implicated in mother-to child
transmission prevention activities) instead of a specific hospital, and one
provincial department that funded it. The Court did not analyze the
specific health institutions that had refused to give Nevirparine because the
suit was generally filed against the national government on account of
national policy. However, unlike in Soobramoney, the Court came to the
opposite conclusion as to an obligation to provide a health service, finding
that as to mother-to-child transmission of HIV: "A potentially lifesaving
drug was on offer and where testing and counseling facilities were
available it could have been administeredwithin the available
resources
149
of the state without any known harm to mother or child.'
In conclusion, although the Court only looked at the allocated amount
of money (and the free provision of a drug) when considering the available

148. Id. 120.
149. Id. 80 (emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss1/5

48

Dugger: Rights Waiting for Change: Socio-Economic Rights in the New South

2007]

RIGHTS WAITING FOR CHANGE: SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

243

resources question, the language of Treatment Action Campaign is
disposed to a wider reading of the available resources analysis.
D. Khoza v. Minister of Social Development
1. Background
In the most recent socio-economic rights case, the Court once again
based it resources analysis on allocated resources.15 ° The case involved a
claim for the provision of social assistance by two Mozambican nationals
who were permanent residents in South Africa. 5 ' In addition, the case
consisted of the claims of children who were South African citizens but
whose parent's noncitizen status prohibited them from receiving social
assistance. The claim was based on section 27(1)(c) of the South African
Constitution, which guarantees "social security, including, if they are
unable to support
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social
51 2
assistance."'
2. Available Resources Jurisprudence
Khoza's most important contribution to available resource
jurisprudence is further fleshing out the role of dignity. The Court adds to
Grootboom'sjurisprudence, holding:
When the rights to life, dignity and equality are implicated in cases
dealing with socio-economic rights, they have to be taken into
account along with the availability of human and financial
resources in determiningwhether the State has complied with the

constitutionalstandardof reasonableness.This is, however, not a
closed list and all relevant factors have to be taken into account in
this exercise. What is relevant may vary from 15case
to case
3
depending on the particular facts and circumstances.

150. Khosa & Others v Ministerof Soc. Dev. & Others, Mahlaule & Others v Ministerof Soc.
Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).
151. See id. 2-4.
152. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 27(l)(c).
153. Khosa, 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 44 (emphasis added). Id. 41 (citing Dawood &
Another v Ministerof Home Aff. & Others, Shalabi & Another v Minister of Home Aff. & Others,
Thomas & Another v Minister of Home Aff. & Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 837
(CC) 17.
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The Court has yet to thresh out the implications of dignity for
reasonableness and available resources. However, it seems that the Court
construes dignity to be an additional consideration, apart from and in
addition to available resources.' 54 At the same time, the very fact that the
reasonableness of the measures and the rate of the realization of the right
are so heavily influenced by available resources, the right to dignity may
have some separate interaction with available resources.' 55 Critical
questions for future litigants, and for the Court itself, are what more does
the right to dignity add? What would taking the right to dignity out of the
Constitution mean (if anything) for the content of socio-economic
rights?' 56
3. The Court's Investigation of Resources: Application of Jurisprudence
Just as in Treatment Action Campaign, the Court found that in the
context of the additional resources that the government had allocated to the
relevant Department of Social Development for the following years, the
requested remedy could be accomplished within the allocated available
resources. In the Court's words:
The development of a system of social grants has been a key pillar
of the government's strategy to fight poverty and promote human
development. This has led to a substantial and rapid increase in
expenditure, . . . excluding costs of administration, has increased
from R16.1 billion to R26.2 billion. It is contemplated that over the
next three years grants will increase from R26.2 billion to R44.6
billion. In addition, provision has to be made for expenditure on
other socioeconomic programmes. Mr. Kruger says that if provision
has to be made for the expenditure necessary to give effect to the
Human dignity... informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a
range of levels. It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all,
other rights ... Section 10 however makes it plain that dignity is not only a value
fundamental to the constitution it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must
be respected and protected. In many cases however, where the value of human
dignity is offended, the primary constitutional breach occasioned may be of a
more specific right such as the right to bodily integrity, the right to equality or the
right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour.
Id.
154. See Liebenberg, supra note 13; Liebenberg, supra note 85, at 21.
155. See Liebenberg, supra note 85, at 21.
156. See Liebenberg, supra note 13; Liebenberg, supra note 85, at 21.
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High Court order, the costs will be large and will result in shortfalls
57
in provincial budgets particularly in the poorer provinces. 1
Approximately one fifth of the projected expenditure is in respect
of child grants and the unconstitutionality of the citizenship
requirement in that section of the Act has already been conceded by
the respondents. The remainder reflect an increase of less than 2%
on the present cost of social grants (currently R26.2 billion) even on
the higher estimate. Bearing in mind that it is anticipated that the
expenditure on grants will, in nay event, increase by a further R18.4
billion over the next three years without making provision for
permanent residents, the cost of including permanent residents in
the systems will be only a small proportion of the total cost.'58
In reaching its decisions, the Court considered that the exclusion of
permanent residents was unreasonable because it constituted unfair
discrimination and violated the right to dignity. 5 9 After analyzing the
overall budget of the Department of Social Development, the Court found
that as a result of these planned increases there were ample resources
allocated to the Department in the coming years to cover the additional
cost of including permanent residents within the social assistance
program. 6 ° The Court again focuses on the allocated budget and saves
itself from conducting an in-depth analysis of available resources that
might result in a conclusion that additional infusion of funds into the
relevant department was necessary.'16
E. President of the Republic of South Africa v. Modderklip Boerdery
During the course of writing this Article, the Constitutional Court
decided Modderklip. Although this case involves the right to housing
under section 26, the Constitutional Court explicitly relied solely on the
right to an effective remedy under section 34 without deciding the socio-

157. Khosa, 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 60.
158. Id. 66.
159. Id.
160. See id. 62.
161. Id. Note, however, that the court also points to the tiny nature of the additional increase
of 2%. "The remainder reflects an increase of less than 2% on the present cost of social grants
(currently R26.2 billion) even on the higher estimate." Id. However, the court seems to rest its
ultimate conclusion on the fact that additional funds are allocated for future years. See id.
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economic rights claims.' 62 As a result, this judgment does very little to
further the discourse on positive socio-economic rights or the available
resources question. Thus, this Article does not address Modderklip.
F. The InternationalCovenant on Economic Social and CulturalRights
The Constitutional Court considered the relevance of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in both Grootboom and Treatment
Action Campaign. Based on its constitutional requirement to consider
relevant international law as a guide to interpretation, the Constitutional
Court adopted the definition of progressive realization in General
Comment 3 but rejected an application
of that Comment's conception of
63
a minimum core obligation.1
An interesting and unexplored portion of the Covenant regarding the
requirement to seek international assistance provides the potential for
further strengthening socio-economic rights. The plain language of Article
2 of the Covenant states that state parties must "take steps, individually
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical."' General Comment 3 further refines and
explains this requirement, stating: "The Committee notes that the phrase
'to the maximum of its available resources' was intended by the drafters
of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a State and
those availablefrom the international
community through international co65
operation and assistance.',
162. See Modderklip Boerdery (Pty)Ltd. v ModderEastSquatters&Another 2001 (4) SA 385
26 ("For purposes of this judgment, and for the reasons that will emerge below, I consider it
unnecessary in this case to reach any conclusions (a) on the question whether.., the rights of the
unlawful occupiers under sections 26(1) and (2) have been breached and if so, to what extent.").
163. See S. AFR. CONST. § 39; id. §§ 231-235; Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft. & Others v
Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 26 ("The relevant international law can be a
guide to interpretation but the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of
international law will vary. However, where the relevant principle of international law binds South
Africa, it may be directly applicable.").
164. See ICESCR, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
165. ESCR COMM., supra note 83, gen. cmt. 3, 13 (emphasis added) ("A final element of
article 2(1), to which attention must be drawn, is that the undertaking given by all States parties is
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical..." The Committee notes that the phrase "to the maximum of its available
resources" was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing
within a State and those available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance. Moreover, the essential role of such co-operation in facilitating the full
realization of the relevant rights is further underlined by the specific provisions contained in articles
11, 15, 22 and 23. With respect to article 22 the Committee has already drawn attention, in General
Comment No. 2 (1990), to some of the opportunities and responsibilities that exist in relation to
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Because the Constitutional Court formerly rejected in Grootboom an
interpretation which maintained that the state need apply the "maximum"
of available resources, it is likely that the Court would not apply the
International Covenant's requirement to the pursuit of the "maximum of
available resources" available throughout the international community.
However, this leaves the door wide open as to whether the Court would
find that its own standard of "within availableresources" also applies to
the question of international assistance. There seems no necessary logical
reason why it might not given the Court's adoption of the definition of
progressive realization as long as the obligation is in line with the
Constitution's "available resources" language. If this were an obligation
and the Court were to apply its current allocative approach, it might then
enforce the obligation by requiring the state to seek out internationally
available resources allocated to supporting socio-economic rights and
programs. In turn, if the Court expands the conception of available
resources beyond allocation, as this Article argues for, the international
assistance obligation might then require that the state make an affirmative
effort to gain access to resources in addition to those already allocated to
the international development of socio-economic rights. Like many other
issues, the Constitutional Court has yet to rule on or address this issue.
A closer look at the specific socio-economic rights obligations imposed
by the Constitution further illuminates the possible implications of the
potential international assistance obligation. General Comment 12 on the
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' states
that the right to food requires that the state seek international assistance
before it make a claim that resources are unavailable to fulfill the right. "A
state claiming that it is unable to carry out its obligations for reasons
beyond its control therefore has the burden of proving that this is the case
and that it has unsuccessfully sought to obtain internationalsupport to
ensure the availability and accessibility of the necessary food. 1 66 What
this requirement begs is what threshold of action the state must exercise
for the Committee to find that the state "sought" support? 167 Is sending a
letter requesting assistance to one nation or international organization
sufficient? Or is something more substantive required in order to meet this
international requirement? Perhaps more importantly, General Comment

international co-operation. Article 23 also specifically identifies "the furnishing of technical
assistance" as well as other activities, as being among the means of "international action for the
achievement of the rights recognized...").
166. Id. gen. cmt. 12, 17 (1990) (emphasis added).
167. A court may find that in this section the covenant is not in line with the constitutional
language and ignore this requirement.
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12 specifies that when the state claims it is unable to carry out its
obligations, the state has the burden of showing that it sought
unsuccessfully international assistance.'68 Even though this language
clearly springs from the fact that the Covenant's language generally
references the "maximum" of available resources, and even if the
"available resources" standard of the South African Constitution were
substituted, it does not follow that the difference in language between the
Covenant and the Constitution would mean that the burden of proof
regarding the search for international assistance should and would fall on
a different party. If adopted by the Court, the duty to seek international
support could become an incredibly important issue in future socioeconomic rights cases.
However, because the right to food has not come before the
Constitutional Court, it is unclear whether the Court would deem this
element of international law to be persuasive or cast it aside as it did the
minimum core concept of General Comment 3.169 Moreover, because the
described burden may be an obligation that itself springs from the
minimum core, there is a substantial chance that the international
assistance obligation might meet the same fate.
G. Summary of the Requirements
What is clear is that the Court has laid out an incredibly complicated
and often implicitly contradictory set of standards regarding the available
resources question. When viewed together, these standards present an
almost maddeningly complex set of requirements. The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights. 7 ° At the
same time, the content of the obligation in relation to the rate at which the
desired result is achieved as well as the reasonableness of the measures
employed to achieve the result are governed by the availability of
resources. 171
However, resources are also one of multiple limiting factors. 72 There
is a balance between goals and means. 73 The measures must move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal, although
168. ESCR CoMM., supra note 83, gen. cmt. 12, 19.
169. Id. gen. cmt. 3.
170. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 26-27; Gov't ofthe Republic ofS. Aft. & Others
v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 74.
171. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 46.
172. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 43.
173. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 40.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss1/5

54

Dugger: Rights Waiting for Change: Socio-Economic Rights in the New South

2007]

RIGHTS WAITING FOR CHANGE: SOCIO-ECONOMICRIGHTS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

249

availability of resources is an important factor in determining what is
reasonable. 74 National government is responsible for allocation of national
175
revenue to the provinces and local government on an equitable basis,
and must ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources are
available.176 A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether
one or more desirable or favorable measures could have been adopted, or
whether public money could have been better spent. 177 The state should
examine and where possible lower legal, administrative, operational, and
financial hurdles to accessibility. 7 The state will fully justify all
deliberately retrogressive measures as to socio-economic rights by
reference to the totality of the rights in the Covenant of Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights and in the context of the full use of the maximum
available resources. 7 9 [The most desperate] are not to be ignored in the
interests of an overall program focused on medium and long-term
objectives. 8 ° It is essential that a reasonable part of the national housing
budget be devoted to [the most desperate], but the precise allocation is for
national government to decide in the first instance.' The state must
budget and monitor the fulfillment of immediate needs and must ensure
that a significant number of desperate people in need are afforded relief,
though not all of them need receive it immediately.8 2 The state must make
provision of funding to create protective regulations for all children.8 3 The
program must also be reasonably implemented and an otherwise be a
reasonable program that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute
compliance with the state's obligations.8 4 Moreover, effective
implementation requires at least adequate budgetary support by national
government. 8 5 At the same time dignity must be taken into account along
with the availability of resources in determining if the obligations have
been met.8 6 There will be times when the state must adopt a holistic

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. 39-40.
177. Id. 41.
178. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 45.
179. Id.
180. Id. 66.
181. Id.
182. Id. 67-68.
183. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 78.
184. Id. 42.
185. Id. 68.
186. Khosa & Others v Minister ofSoc. Dev. & Others, Mahlaule & Others v Minister ofSoc.
Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 44.
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approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the specific
needs of particular individuals within society.'87 And finally, the Court's
determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications,
but are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets.'88
In light of these intersecting obligations, one must congratulate the
Constitutional Court for its theoretical development of the first direct
constitutional available resources jurisprudence. The only difficulty that
the Court's historic achievement creates is: how can we interpret all of
these requirements together?
H. PracticalImplications of the Case Law
Despite the verbosity with which the Court has described the various
state socio-economic rights obligations as they apply to the available
resources limitation, the practical implications of these requirements are
not immediately clear. The following three commonsense scenarios will
attempt to demonstrate the possible practical implications of the
Constitutional Court's available resources jurisprudence.
1. What Happens If the Government of South Africa Allocates Only
One Dollar to the Realization of a Socio-Economic Right
This question implicates two possible scenarios. First, a dollar is
allocated to a newly enshrined Constitutional socio-economic right. In this
scenario, the applicable standards are relatively weak. The Court's
approach appears to be that there would be no obligation to increase
funding for this socio-economic right. There is simply no explicit
acknowledgment from the Court's jurisprudence that the state is required
to make available a "reasonable" amount of resources available for any
socio-economic right.'89 If one dollar were allocated equitably amongst
provincial and local governments, if a significant portion of this dollar
were used to afford relief to the most needy, and if allocation of one dollar

187. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 31.
188. Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) 38.
189. Some commentators have suggested that such an obligation exists, however there does
not seem to be an anchor in South African case law for such a finding, see, e.g.,SUNSTEIN, supra
note 13, ch. 10 Social and Economic Rights? Lessons From South Africa.
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met all of the previously mentioned requirements, then the amount would
pass the Constitutional Court's available resources standards.' 90
At the same time, within the context of one dollar, the government will
have an obligation to use the allocated money as expeditiously and
effectively as possible, whereas unallocated money is arguably not subject
to this standard. In this regard, allocating only one dollar to a socioeconomic right has the advantage of insulating a larger portion of the
government's overall resources from the judicial requirement of
"expeditious and efficient" use.
In the second possible scenario, the government reduces its previously
allocated budget for a socio-economic right to one dollar. The right funded
before the change in allocation will have to be analyzed under the higher
retrogressive standard of the maximum of available resources, as a well as
justified in the context of all the rights in the Covenant (in this case the
Constitution).
2. What Happens If the Government of South Africa Does Not Increase
Allocated Money for the Realization of a Socio-Economic Right for
Twenty-Five Years
This hypothetical presents one of the most difficult, unanswered
questions of South Africa's available resources jurisprudence. The answer
depends on the interpretation of the progressive realization requirement
contained within sections 26 and 27 of the South African Constitution.
Progressive realization can be either a target constantly striven for, or a
substantive requirement mandating certain outcomes. 9 ' And when
interpreted in light of the reasonableness requirement, progressive
realization can be further read in two additional ways. In one manner,
reasonableness considers that progressive realization in the South African
context requires it to shoot to a goal towards which measures must shoot
or aspire to be considered reasonable. In the other manner, progressive
realization requires that in order to be reasonable there must in fact be
some sort of outcome that is demonstrative of progressive realization.' 92
While progressive realization in the international context is not geared
towards outcomes, a textual argument exists in the case of the South

190.
resource
191.
192.

Liebenberg has previously suggested that there should be a reasonableness element to
allocation. See Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 20; Liebenberg, supra note 13.
Conversation with Kevin Iles, Summer 2004, Community Law Centre.
Id.
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African context that the requirement to "achieve the progressive realisation
of this right" could imply an output element as well.' 93
However, more importantly, "[h]ousing must be made more accessible
not only to a larger number of people but to a wider range of people as
time progresses.' 94 The state must increase the number as well as the
range of people as time progresses even with constant resource levels. If
the state fails to increase service provision it technically should violate
progressive realization. A complicating question is when do people receive
access to a right? In the case of social grant or food which they may
consume daily or monthly, do they receive access once they receive the
item, or does to receive access mean that these food supplements or grants
be maintained? The question is important because since the number and
range of society must be increased there may be a prima facie violation of
obligation if the same people receive the same "access" every year.
What the best interpretation of this constitutional language implies that
working with the same resources, the state cannot simply maintain a
national program that does not attempt to expand numerically and
substantively. 95 Moreover, if quality goes down it might be framed as a
failure to progressively realize, or more specifically be categorized as a
deliberate retrogression.
3. What Happens If the Government of South Africa Reduces the
Allocated Money Given to the Realization of a Socio-Economic Right
In this hypothetical, the Court would analyze withdrawal of support
within the framework of retrogressive measures. If the state reduced
funding in hopes of realizing a socio-economic right, the reduction would
arguably have to be in furtherance of another socio-economic right. In
addition, the retrogression would be subject to the higher level of scrutiny:
"maximum of available resources."' 96 If the retrogression could not be
given "the most careful consideration" regarding these two requirements,
it would be constitutionally prohibited.

193. Id.
194. Id. 45.
195. Id. See also Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 20.
196. This distinction is emphasized by the constitutional court's unwillingness to apply the
same words in the Covenant as to the question of available resources in Grootboom.
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MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S
CURRENT AVAILABLE RESOURCES APPROACH

A. The Definition ofAvailability
Based on the Court's current approach to socio-economic rights and
available resources, the national government's allocated amount of
resources R5 could potentially define the content of a right and its rate of
realization without any route ofjudicial appeal for the population. 97 Such
a state of affairs essentially leaves the definition of socio-economic rights
purely to the government. While few would argue that the government
should not maintain primary decision-making status in determining how
to meet its constitutional socio-economic rights obligations, the
government cannot be allowed to define wholly, through its allocation
decisions, the content of socio-economic rights. 198 Whatever the role of the
courts it must be more than exists at present because an available resources
limitation is different from according to government will or whim. Thus,
South Africa's current approach cannot be accepted as a correct
application of the constitution.
In all of its rulings on socio-economic rights, the Court has relied on
the allocated amount available in the department or project budget. Before
the final ruling in each case, the Court looks to allocated resources made
available by the government and finds that there existed sufficient
resources without further questioning availability. Darrel Moellendorf, in
Reasoning about Resources, frames the difficulty with this approach:
Available resources is however ambiguous, as it has both narrow
and broad sense. It may mean those resources that a ministry or
department has been allocated and has budgeted for the protection
of the right. Alternatively, it may mean any resources that the state
can marshal to protect the right. These are the two extreme senses
of the terms. To be sure, between the narrowest interpretation and
the broadest lie other senses.199
Within this spectrum of interpretation, the Court has taken the
narrowest view when evaluating available resources:

197. See Liebenberg, supranote 28.
198. Id.
199. Darrel Moellendorf, ReasoningAboutResources:Soobramoney andthe FutureofSocioEconomic Rights Claims, 14 SAJHR (1998).
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1. In Soobramaney, the Court looked at the hospital's allocated budget to
the service in question, and then to the provincial department of health
budget and focused on over-expenditure to find that no resources were
available.
2. In Grootboom, the Court did consider whether resources were
available. The Court interpreted available resources to require that a
significant part of the budget address the needs of the most desperate.
3. In TreatmentAction Campaign, the Court looked at the total combined
allocated budgets of the Departments that dealt in some way with
mother-to-child transmission of HIV prevention programs, and found
that more money had been allocated recently and, therefore, resources
were available.
4. In Khosa, the Court looked to the recent increase in the allocated
budget of the Department of Social Development and found that the
large amount of additional funds would cover the increase its order
required.
However, it is unclear whether this pattern has been a purposeful
choice or is the result of the state, in each case, allocating at some point
between the beginning and end of the proceedings more money to the
socio-economic right in question. If this choice has been purposeful, not
only does it seem shortsighted, but it also will have incredibly detrimental
effects on the integrity of socio-economic rights in the new South Africa.
Whether intentional or accidental, this approach has many practical
drawbacks aside from the previously discussed constitutional
interpretation problems. For instance, the approach may encourage
minimal future allocation by the state to socio-economic rights programs.
Because increased allocation to programs has resulted in increased binding
socio-economic rights obligations, the government may be hesitant to
increase funding for future programs.
In addition, the state may become far more vigorous in attempting to
end the year without surplus funds out of fear of being held liable for not
doing more to meet its obligation to be expeditious and effective. If a state
agency does not exhaust its resources each year, it opens itself to the claim
that it did not pursue realizing a socio-economic right within "available
resources" and that it was not expeditious and effective in fulfilling the
right. While this pressure to utilize all resources may in fact be just the
outcome desired by supporters of socio-economic rights, a possible
negative aspect of this incentive is that the would be excess money will
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simply be hidden, laundered, or spent irrationally on unnecessary projects
just for the sake of exhausting funds by year's end. A government that
seeks to avoid being bound to provide additional services, that anticipates
a future Court challenge has an incentive to spend unused allocated funds
as quickly as possible [on anything possible] (whether or not they are
effective) in order to block the claim that they could have done more
within their available resources.
A third practical drawback of the current approach is that it will
encourage the government to perhaps unnecessarily disburse its overall
budget across a broad range of programs. In spreading resources around,
the government may attempt to avoid a binding socio-economic rights
obligation in an area based on apparent available resources. For example,
although there might be a disproportionately disbursed need for the
realization of the right to food, the government may hesitate to similarly
disproportionately disburse resources to fulfill this right out of a concern
that a noticeably large amount of allocated resources for one area or
program would "stick out" and attract the attention of litigants, and
ultimately the Constitutional Court. This egregious "sticking out" is
exactly what happened in the Indian Supreme Court case of People's
Unionfor Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Food Union of India.2 °°
In People's Union, the mass storage of excess grain in large Indian
government facilities close to starving people prompted the Court to hold
that the Indian government had violated the right to food. As described by
the petition filed by People's Union
[C]lose to 50 million tonnes of grain are lying idle in public
godowns in Rajasthan and across the country. There is so much
grain in the Government's reserves that the Respondent no. 2, the
Food Corporation of India has run out of storage space. In some
cases, there is barely a distance of 75 kilometers between the
location of these godowns and the places where starvation is
rampant, people are malnourished, and cattle are dying.20 '
Had the state distributed the same amount of grain in smaller, less
noticeable quantities the same amount of grain throughout the entire state
of India, it might not have attracted the attention of litigants or the court
and the state might have escaped an adverse judgment. Put differently,
state might not change their behavior, they just might not horde resources
200. People's Unionfor Civil Liberties v Union of India (1997) 3 S.C.C. 433.
201. HAVE FOOD, WILL STARVE, Human Rights Documentation Center, http://www.hrdc.
net/sahrdc/hrfchr59/Issue3/India.htm.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

61

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

256

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

in an equally concentrated and obnoxious manner. Indeed, it would have
been far more difficult for the Indian Supreme Court to determine that
food resources were readily available if it had been forced to do a more
extensive analysis of every small local storage facility's surplus grain
throughout the entire country. Instead it needed to identify a smaller
number of enormous storage facilities that could not be missed in the most
perfimctory review.
However, although the South African Constitutional Court has yet to
define clearly or apply concretely the implications of its available
resources jurisprudence, its rulings do suggest that there is a minimal level
of funding that must be made available by the government. Despite the
Court's simplistic allocation-based approach, the following appear to be
the standards that should be informing the Court's analysis of the amount
of allocated resources and/or the availability of resources:
" The national government allocation of national revenue to the
provinces and local government on an equitable basis. °2
" The reasonable plan must also ensure that the appropriatefinancial
and human resources are available.2 °3
* Effective implementation requires at leastadequatebudgetarysupport
by national government. 2"
" It is essential that a reasonablepart of the national housing budget be
devoted to [the most needy], but the precise allocation is for national
government to decide in the first instance.2"5
" Must ensure that a significantnumber of desperatepeople in need are
afforded relief,though not all of them need receive it immediately." 6
" This includes the obligation to devise fund implement and supervise
20 7
measures to provide reliefto those in desperate need.

202. Gov 't of the Republic ofS. Aft. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) 40.
203. Id. 39.
204. Id. 68.
205. Id. 66.
206. Id. 68.
207. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 96.
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The state must provide "basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care
services and social services" to children not under the care of "parents
or families. 2 °s
Not outlining the criteria that the Court will use to define and
determine what "adequate budgetary" support from the national
government constitutes, what "appropriate" financial and human resources
encompasses, what the bare minimum of"a reasonable part of the national
housing budget for the most needy could be," or the requirement to "fund"
measures for the most desperate, or fully defining what availability means
leaves such determinations to the ad-hoc subconscious, subjective, and
perhaps constantly shifting conceptions of each Constitutional Court
judge. Imagine eleven different scales all tuned at slightly different
calibrations. Although each scale is weighing "available resources" and
"reasonableness," each scale will produce different measurements for
items that possess an objective, though unascertained, weight.20 9 Without
more clearer, more definite criteria, standards, and guidelines as to the
precise meaning of the Court's available resources standards and
requirements, the judges cannot ascertain an objective reasonableness
standard. In turn, the judges cannot be held accountable for their decisions.

208. Id. 1 76 (citing S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights) § 28); see id 77.
209. One's socio-economic background and individual personal experiences will necessarily
affect their view of reasonableness. It does not seem that reasonableness for a white Africaan's
former supporter of the apartheid regime, will be the same reasonableness as for a former freedom
fighting Zulu. Similarly, many if not all judges of the Constitutional Court will almost inevitably
become disconnected from mainstream South African society and its conception of what is
reasonable, if only because their salary and assets place them in the very uppermost wealth bracket
of the nation. For example, in the United States (the "[C]urrent salary for the Chief Justice is around
$202,900 per year, while Associate Justices make about $194,200.") while the average salary in
the United States is $36,764. See "US.gov.info," at http://usgovinfo.about.com/blctjustices.htm;
see http://www.bls.gov/cew/State2002.txt. More interestingly still,
According to financial disclosure reports for 2001, five ofthe nine Supreme Court
justices are millionaires, and the other four are not far behind. These reports
actually underestimate the wealth of the justices, since they exclude primary
residences. Were the homes of the justices included in the financial reports, it is
likely that all nine would top one million dollars in net worth.
Id.; see U.S. Supreme Court Packed with Millionaires, June 17, 2002, http://www.wsws.org/
articles/2002/jun2002/rich-j 17.shtml; see also Holly Manges Jones, Six Supreme CourtJusticesare
Millionaires, JURIST: LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Jun. 11, 2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2005/06/six-supreme-court-justices-are.php.
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Admittedly, when and if the Court clarifies the precise meaning of
these standards, that meaning will likewise be the result of the judges'
subjective views about how to best determine "availability" or
reasonableness. However, the advantage will be that these determinations
will be transparent, and as such, less susceptible to being applied
selectively on an ad hoc basis.
From practical, political, and public policy points of view, the current
approach is not helpfil to any of the stakeholders it affects. The
government has little guidance as to the minimum amount of funding it is
constitutionally required to allocate to each and all socio-economic
right(s).2"' Despite the benefit the government may feel it derives from
having no restrictions or requirements as to the allocation and funding
socio-economic rights, there are also definite costs to this approach. When
a case is finally brought querying the interpretation of the Court's holdings
on available resources, the government risks being on the wrong side of
this judgment when the Court issues its definitive interpretation. The
ANC's legitimacy will face a large political blow if the Court finds that the
government has been under-funding socio-economic rights programs.
Potentially, the Court could also order the state to make up for previous
under-funding by increasing funding for future years.2" 1' Such a ruling

210. See Iles, supra note 51, at 454.
Part of the difficulty in our socio-economic rights jurisprudence has been the
reluctance of the Constitutional Court to engage in the task of defining the scope
and content of socio-economic rights. Failing to enunciate the scope of the right,
or leaving it to be developed on a case-by-case basis, leaves the executive with
little guidance as to what will be expected of it in the implementation of socioeconomic rights. The state cannot know how to realise a right if there has been no
statement as to precisely what it is that the state should be attempting to realise.
Id.
211. This observation is all the more important in light of the fact that the Treatment Action
Campaign court also emphasized that
If it is necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to
secure the protection and enforcement of these all-important rights... Particularly
in a country where so few have the means to enforce their rights through the
courts, it is essential that on those occasions when the legal process does establish
that an infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively
vindicated. The courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are
obliged to'forge new tools' and shape innovative remedies, ifneeds be, to achieve
this goal.
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would further disrupt the government's budgetary independence, which
the state and others have argued forcefully that the judiciary currently
threatens.
A second major political shortcoming for the state is that to the extent
that the government is currently under-funding socio-economic rights, the
Court's silence leaves the government with the potentially false impression
that its current larger macroeconomic plan is congruent with its
constitutional obligations. If the current regime is found to be lacking in
the future, then the Court's silence will only increase the costs, disruptions,
difficulties, and hurdles that a future economic transformation to a
radically different macroeconomic policy might require. 2 ' 2 On the other
hand, if current macroeconomic policy is sufficient, this silence creates
needless doubt within and beyond the government as to whether the
current macroeconomic policy is sufficient to meet the obligations of the
Constitution." 3

See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign& Others 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC)
102 (citing Fose v Minister of Safety and Security, 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC)).
212. CASSIEM & STREAK, supra note 13.
213. However, such a conclusion is doubtful. A court would clearly not directly make this
decision regarding its macroeconomic policy. However, through its judgments and the "financial
implications" they incurred, the state itself might be forced to conclude that drastically more
resources than provided by its existing macroeconomic policy were required to meet its
constitutional socio-economic rights obligations. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, General Comment 3 emphasizes that the Covenant itself does not proscribe any specific
economic macroeconomic policy or governmental form, but that the concern is more pointedly the
meeting of the obligations themselves, and not the means by which they are met. ICESCR, supra
note 8, gen. cmt. 3, 8.
The Committee notes that the undertaking "to take steps . . . by all appropriate
means including particularly the adoption of legislative measures" neither requires
nor precludes any particular form of government or economic system being used
as the vehicle for the steps in question, provided only that it is democratic and that
all human rights are thereby respected. Thus, in terms of political and economic
systems the Covenant is neutral and its principals cannot accurately be described
as being predicated exclusively upon the need for, or the desirability of a socialist
or a capitalist system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or laissez-faire economy, or
upon any other particular approach. In this regard, the Committee reaffirms that
the rights recognized in the Covenant are susceptible of realization within the
context of a wide variety of economic and political systems, provided only that the
interdependence and indivisibility of the two sets of human rights, as affirmed
inter alia in the preamble to the Covenant, is recognized and reflected in the
system in question.
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Of course, the government is not the only stakeholder potentially
harmed by the Court's current approach. Civil society suffers when the
Court does not speak clearly concerning the content of its available
resources language. NGO's pushing for greater socio-economic rights
services are left with no clear answer as to whether the judicial system is
a useful arena in which to expend their own limited resources fighting for
socio-economic rights. If available resources are simply what the
government says that at they are, then court battles regarding socioeconomic rights enforcement are largely a waste of time for NGO's, since
such rights are then entirely defined by the resources the government
allocated. If there is no effective means of widening the "available
resources" inquiry beyond mere government allocation, the only
productive means by which to affect such allocation is through lobbying
government directly through the political process and not wasting time
litigating effectively pre-determined socio-economic rights cases.
Of course the largest losers in the current framework are the people of
South Africa. The current approach means that citizens and residents of
South Africa lose the intended benefits of constitutional socio-economic
rights-benefits that so much pain, suffering and bloodshed were endured
to create. If the government in unable to reduce substantively unmet need
for socio-economic rights fulfillment, this failure will undermine the
population's faith in the Constitution and the current political structure. In
time, this failure could even lead to increased racial, tribal, or class-based
strife.
Even if the Court holds that the government's obligations to fund
socio-economic rights are completely discretionary-that these rights are
simply "rights waiting for change"--the population deserves notification
that such is the true nature of their rights. Given this notice, the preapartheid generation of South Africa would then have the information
needed to decide if such a constitutional regime is what they had
envisioned during their fight for a new South Africa. Just as importantly,
the younger post-apartheid generation should be given this notice so that
they can make an informed decision regarding whether such a weak
constitutional framework is acceptable to them; and if the framework it not
acceptable, to take the opportunity to further strengthen socio-economic
rights by amending the Constitution. In short, the people of South Africa
have a moral and arguably legal right to constitutional notice and
transparency. The Court has required government decisions and measures
to be transparent in order to pass the test of reasonableness:
In order for it to be implemented optimally, a public health
programme must be made known effectively to all concerned, down
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to the district nurse and patients. Indeed, for a public programme
such as this to meet the constitutional requirement of
14
reasonableness, its contents must be made known appropriately.
In the matter of available resources, the Court should heed its own words
and "make known" its own judicial standards and the corresponding
content of the South African people's constitutional rights.
In conclusion, the current ambiguous nature of "available resources"
is detrimental to all socio-economic rights stakeholders of South Africa.
B. The UndefinedBurden of Proof
The most glaring shortcoming of the "available resources"
jurisprudence is the lack of a defined burden of proof for the question of
available resources in socio-economic rights cases. The Court has not in
any of the four socio-economic rights judgments delineated clearly who
bears the burden of proving whether resources are "available. 21 5 This
issue is perhaps the most important in socio-economic rights litigation
because "available resources" and more specifically what resources the
court finds to be available so heavily influence the content of the rights. As
to date, the submissions of both parties regarding available resources are
subject to the judges' individual determinations on the validity of the
statements and resource indicators.
The lack of a clear designation of the burden of proof likely results
from the distortions and confusions that have arisen in attempting to heave
the traditional South African two-step constitutional rights inquiry onto the
relatively new socio-economic rights cases.216
The difficulty of applying the traditional approach to the available
resources question is that such determinations and evidence are fully under
the government's control. It is unreasonable to expect citizens to find own
their own data invalidating the government's official resources estimates

214. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 123.
215. It should be noted that the Khosa court does affirm a general duty of the state to provide
evidence as to challenges to legislative measures cases, however this does not speak directly to the
burden of evidence as to issues of fact nor does it directly address "resources." The Khosa court
found that, "[i]f the necessary evidence is not placed before the courts dealing with such matters
their ability to perform their constitutional mandate will be hampered and the constitutional scheme
itself put at risk. It is government's duty to ensure that the relevant evidence is placed before the
court." Khosa & Others v Minister of Soc. Dev. & Others, Mahlaule & Others v Ministerof Soc.
Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 19.
216. See Iles, supra note 51, at 453 ("Courts follow a two-stage approach to rights
interpretation.").
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or to find other factors the government might point to in support of its
defense. There are no means by which individual citizens can ascertain the
state's amount of available resource without relying on the state's own
representations. Moreover, as stated earlier, focusing on the government's
allocation of funds as the basis of available resources determinations
provides the government with incentives to conceal resources and unspent
monies. The more transparent and accurate the government is at managing
financial resources, the more the government exposes itselfto future socioeconomic rights litigation and adverse judgments.
Despite the Constitutional Court's institutional silence as to this matter,
commonsense would require that the state must carry the burden of
proving the lack of available resources. Commentators, including sitting
Constitutional Court Justice O'Regan, have found this approach to be the
most logical and reasonable: "[G]overnment is under an obligation to show
that it acted bona fide and rationally in the circumstances. This carries an
evidentiary burden. State officials are required to place evidence before the
Court of their policy regarding the rationing of scarce dialysis equipment
and their budgets."2 7 Similarly, Sandra Liebenberg states: It would be
unreasonable to expect ordinary litigants to identify and to quantify all the
resources available to the State for the realization of particular
socioeconomic rights. If the state wishes to rely on a lack of available
resources in order to rebut an allegation that it has failed to take reasonable
measures, it should bear the burden of proving the alleged unavailability
of resources.2"'
Not surprisingly, in the Constitutional Court's recent Rail Commuter
Action Group v. Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorailjudgment, Judge O'Regan
incorporated these views into the decision when she held:
A final consideration will be the relevant human and financial
resource constraints that may hamper the organ of state in meeting
its obligation. This last criterion will require careful consideration
when raised. In particular, an organ of state will not be held to have
reasonably performed a duty simply on the basis of a bald assertion
of resource constraints. Details of the precise character of the
resource constraints, whether human or financial, in the context of
the overall resourcing of the organ of state will need to be provided.
The standard of reasonableness so understood conforms to the
217. Kate O'Regan, IntroducingSocio-EconomicRights, ECON. Soc. RTS. REV., Mar. 1999,
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr 999/1999march-oregan.php.
218. Sandra Liebenberg, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARY AND
CASES 350-51 (Dennis Davis et al. eds., 1997); see also Liebenberg, supra note 85.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss1/5

68

Dugger: Rights Waiting for Change: Socio-Economic Rights in the New South

RIGHTS WAITING FOR CHANGE: SOCIO-ECONOMICRIGHTS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

2007]

263

constitutional principles of accountability, on the one hand, in that
it requires decision-makers to disclose their reasons for their
conduct, and the principle of effectiveness on the other, for it does
not unduly hamper the decision-maker's authority to determine
what are reasonable and appropriate measures in the overall context
of their activities.219
Unfortunately, while the Court references its past socio-economic rights
cases in outlining the parameters of evaluating positive obligations, socioeconomic rights were not at issue in Rail Commuter Action Group. Rail
Commuter Action Group involved a claim based on the rights to "life, to
freedom from all forms of violence from private sources, to human
dignity, freedom of movement and to property" none of which are subject
to the internal limitation of available resources, and as such will likely be
distinguished by the Constitutional Court.22° Moreover, the Constitutional
Court was not solely considering the direct application of these unqualified
rights, but was interpreting the obligation posed by an act of parliament,
the Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act, No. 9
of 1989, in light ofthe aforementioned unqualified Constitutional rights.22'
Nevertheless, the Court took a great first step forward regarding the burden
219. Rail CommuterAction Group v Transnet Ltd.t/a Metrorail2003 (12) BCLR 1363 (SCA)

88.
220. Id. 6.
It is declared that the manner in which the rail commuter services in the Western
Cape are;
2.1 operated by the First Respondent;
2.2. controlled and funded by the Second Respondent;
2.3. policed by the South African Police Service;
2.4. monitored by the Fifth Respondent;
insofar as the provision of proper and adequate safety and security services and
the control of access to and egress from rail facilities used by rail commuters in
the Western Cape are concerned, is wrongful, unlawful and in violation of the
constitutional rights of rail commuters to life, to freedom from all forms of
violence from private sources, to human dignity, freedom of movement and to
property.
Id.
221. See Rail Commuter Action Group, 2003 (12) BCLR 1363 (SCA) 79 ("The applicants
sought declaratory relief on the basis of the provisions of the SATS Act read in the light of the
Constitution."); id. 106 ("I have concluded that Metrorail and the Commuter Corporation bear
an obligation in terms of the SATS Act interpreted in the light of the Constitution to ensure that
reasonable measures are taken to provide for the safety and security of rail commuters on the rail
commuter service they operate.").
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of proof when it concluded that courts should scrutinize closely
government claims under a reasonableness review for positive obligations
when considering the "relevant human and financial resource constraints."
An interesting observation here is that the Court seems to accede that even
in the context of rights that lack the internal available resources limitation
of sections 26 and 27, reasonableness is in some ways similarly informed
by resource constraints.
Hopefully, the Court will eventually extend this judgment to the
available resources jurisprudence, which guides the courts' interpretation
of sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution. The vacated High Court
judgment in Rail Commuter Action Group forms the basis of a proposed
alternative approach to the available resource limitation, which Part IV
discusses. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court did not apply the High
Court judgment's stricter applied inquiry into the legitimacy of the
resource defense in reaching its conclusion.
Requiring the state to prove affirmatively, against a presumption of
availability, its resource constraint defense, will engender more
accountability and perhaps objectivity as to the available resources
question. Moreover, since the state has incentives to conceal the real
amount of available resources, an independent review of such questions by
a body without a vested interest in the outcome would be appropriate. The
body that would logically fulfill this role would be the South African
Auditor General. The subsequent solutions section in Part V discusses the
possibilities presented by the Auditor General's involvement.
C. The Interrelatednessand Interdependency of Socio-Economic and
Civil and PoliticalRights
Another element that the Court seems to overlook in its current
approach to the question of available resources is the equality,
interdependence, and interconnectedness of socio-economic rights and
civil and political rights.222 As observed in Darrel Moellendorf's
Reasoning About Resources:
One approach is to take the certification judgment's claim of the
equivalent status and other rights at face value, on this reading only
those resource limitations that can justify the non-protection of
other rights justify the non-protection of socioeconomic rights. If
greater taxation, reduced military spending, or debt renunciation are

222. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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required to fulfill socioeconomic rights, then there is as much cause
to pursue these policies as there would be to say a fair trial.223
The immediate response to this line of reasoning is obviously that civil and
political rights do not have the internal limitations that socio-economic
rights possess. 224 The argument goes that the same amount of effort and
perseverance required to provide civil and political rights cannot be
applied to socio-economic rights because of their internal limitations. If
this is the case, how should the equality, interdependence, and
interconnectedness of socio-economic rights affect efforts to respect,
protect, promote, and fulfill these rights? It would make sense that
although socio-economic rights have internal limitations, an equal effort
should be given not only to making resources available, but also to the
investigation of whether they are available (as is given to the enforcement
of civil and political rights). The primary content of the right is based on
what resources are available. To omit an analysis of whether the state
made reasonable efforts to make resources available would effectively
eviscerate the rights of any substantive content. 225 Rights are serious things
and should be treated seriously. Following this line of reasoning, it would
be logical that the government should be obligated to take reasonable
measures to make resources available for socio-economic rights.
The distinction between the socio-economic and civil and political
rights also implies a far more fragile separation between these two sets of
rights than the Court seems to acknowledge. In Judge Albie Sach's article,
The Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights: The Grootboom
Case, he outlines the fundamental distinction between socio-economic and
civil and political rights:
The problem in all cases concerned with enforcing socioeconomic
rights is precisely that resources are always limited. In this context
I stated that social and economic rights by their very nature
involved rationing. Such rationing should not be considered a
restriction on the right of access to health care, but the very
condition for its proper exercise. Socioeconomic rights in this
respect are different in their mode of enjoyment, if not in their
essence, from civil and political rights. The right to free speech is

223. Moellendorf, supra note 13.
224. Id.
225. See Liebenberg, supra note 28.
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not by its nature rationed. Everybody can speak their mind just as
everybody above a certain age can vote. Difficult problems may
arise in terms of their practical exercise, for example in relation to
access to public broadcasting or having the financial means to
establish independent media or running an election campaign. But
the rights are fully-fledged from the start, and not subject to
progressive realization. If A expresses him or herself or votes in a
certain way, this does not prevent B from expressing him or herself
or from voting in the same or different ways. The progressive
realization of socioeconomic rights within available resources, on
the other hand, indicates that the system of apportionment is
fundamental to their very being. I am not sure as to the full
implications of this distinction, both in terms of conceptualising the
nature of the right and in respect of determining appropriate
remedies for a breach. Yet I am convinced that the exercise of a
right that by its nature is shared, often competitively, with other
holders of the right, must have different legal characteristics from
the exercise of a classical individual civil right that is autonomous
and complete in itself.226
Although the Court has commented on the interconnectedness and
interdependence of rights, its language seems to have little practical effect
upon the understanding of socio-economic rights. Implicitly, the reason for
such an omission likely stems from the distinctions and reservations
articulated above by Judge Sachs. Nonetheless, this reasoning possesses
a variety of shortcomings.
There are two ways to conceptualize civil and political rights.
According to Judge Sachs, one way to conceptualize the right to vote is as
' From
"autonomous and complete in itself."227
this perspective, the right to
vote becomes complete when the state opens and maintains voting stations
and the written law states that "everybody above a certain age can vote."
Thus, the right to vote is self-standing. Although state action, such as poll
taxes, literacy tests and other administrative hurdles, may at times infringe
upon the content of the right, the content is, nevertheless, "full-fledged
from the start." This view sees the state as fulfilling its civil and political
rights obligations primarily through designating and respecting the rights
as "full-fledged" rights. However, from the author's perspective, this view
of civil and political rights is shortsighted.
226. Albie Sachs, The Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights: The Grootboom Case,
at 14, Http://www.lawsociety.ie/documents/committees/hr/lectures/23.6.2005.pdf.
227. Id.
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A more comprehensive view sees evidence of a partially implemented
right that was never "fully realized." The existence of polling stations,
literacy tests, or difficult registration methods means that the right was
never complete, not that the right has simply not been further buttressed
with additional benefits. 228 The distinction articulated by Judge Sachs
between socio-economic and civil and political rights simply ignores that
while political rights are very much negative rights, theirfull realization
requires positive actions. Furthermore, additional actions could be required
to realize civil and political rights if the "minimum core" concept was
transferred from socio-economic rights and applied to civil and political
rights. The creation of a voting apparatus, judicial systems and due process
are all entirely positive elements of a civil and political right typically
construed as a negative right requiring only the duty to respect. As Judge
Sachs acknowledges in his judgment in August v. ElectoralCommission,
"[t]he right to vote by its very nature impose[d] positive obligations upon
'
the legislature and the executive."229
What is argued here is that the Court gives too little consideration to
this similarity in its treatment of socio-economic rights cases. It matters
little that all may speak freely of their political beliefs if the voices of the
rich drown out the voices of the poor. Those who exercise the right to vote
in a city plagued by machine politics can hardly be said to be fully
realizing their right to vote. Moreover, the extent to which a person feels
free to speak is not determined solely by a governmental declaration that
there is freedom of speech and a lack of government retaliation against
those who chose to do so. The full realization of the right to speak requires
the commitment of resources and attention from the state to protect
citizens from violence or other retribution for their words. The quality of
such protection ultimately determines the content of the right, especially
when considering the most vulnerable members of society. What Justice
Sachs' differentiation between socio-economic and civil and political
rights forgets is that Court has extended the concept of substantive equality

228. It would be ridiculous to argue that 50 years from now with the advent of the technologies
and new societal dynamics that the fulfillment of democracy at a minimum would be widely
perceived to be the same just as democracy today and at the time of the Greeks was seen as
requiring different minimum components.
229. August vElectoral Commision 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) at 24, 1999 (3) SA 1, [2000] 1
LRC 608, (1999) 2 CHRLD 407. In this judgment Judge Sach's final order held that the state was
required to "make all reasonable arrangements necessary to enable [them] ...to vote ..." Id.
(emphasis added). The similarity to the final orders of socio-economic rights cases is incredibly
striking. See August v. Electoral Commission Constitutional Court Media Summary,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/S-CCT8-99.
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to both types of rights.23 ° The uniform treatment of differently situated
individuals does not necessarily connote equality. 3 '
Freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial and due process all require
resource rationing. Likewise, these rights have budgetary implications,
which are based on the concomitant activities, like police funding and
training, and court funding. Indeed, it does little good to have an unfettered
and professional election if corruption and graft paralyze the ability of
elected officials to actualize the democratic wishes of their constituents.
As such, the scope of the right to vote must also consider attempts to fight
corruption.
CertificationJudgmentitself explicitly acknowledges the costs of civil
and political rights:
[E]ven when a court enforces civil and political rights such as
equality freedom, of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order it
makes will often have such [budgetary] implications. A court may
require the provision of legal aid, or the extension of state benefits
to a class of people who formerly were not beneficiaries of such
benefits. In our view it cannot be said that by including
socioeconomic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon
the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by
a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the separation of
powers.232
The Court similarly found that, "[a]s we have stated in the previous
paragraph, many of the civil and political rights entrenched in the
CONSTITUTION will give rise to similar budgetary implications without
compromising their justiciability."233
The Court's current approach to socio-economic rights omits full
consideration of the fact that the quality of civil and political rights vary
according to the resources given to them, just as is the case for socioeconomic rights. Indeed, the realization of civil and political rights
undeniably varies in quality across nations, often in direct proportion to the
resources dedicated to those rights. Due process in the United States is a
different kind of due process than that found in Cambodia. A justice
system can weaken or strengthen the protections available for the accused

230. See City Council of Pretoriav J Walker, CCT 8/97.
231. See O'Regan, supranote 70.
232. In Re Certificationof the Constitutionof the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744
(CC) 77.
233. Id. 78.
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based on how much care, time, and money it is willing to dedicate to each
individual. The reality that civil and political rights are not implemented
uniformly is an inescapable reality, despite that civil and political rights
universally require immediate realization and that resources cannot be
relied upon as an excuse for the failure to realize the rights.
In addressing the state's attempt to point to an available resources
defense to a claim based on civil and political rights, the Constitutional
Court found in Electoral Commission:
It was also contended that ifspecialarrangementswere to be made
forprisonersthe resourcesof the commission would be... strained
to burstingpoint by the need to make equivalent arrangementsfor
citizens abroad, pilots, long-distance truck drivers, and poor
persons living in remote areas without public transport.A similar
argument was robustly rejected by MarshallJ.in O'Brien. On the
one hand we have a determinate class of persons, subject to
relatively easy and inexpensive administrative control, who have
consistently asserted their claims, who are physically prevented
from exercising their voting rights whatever their wishes are and
who have been given a specific undertakingby thefirst and second
respondents that should the Court so direct, the necessary
arrangementswould be madefor them to registerand vote... We
cannot deny strong actual claims timeously asserted by the
determinate people, because of the possible existence of
hypothetical claims that
might conceivably have been brought by
234
indeterminategroups.

Although it may not be acknowledged explicitly, the full realization of
civil and political rights is a goal to which governments can aspire, but it
likely cannot be met in the near term. Civil and political rights, like socioeconomic rights, exist on a sliding scale of quality within and across
nations.
What is most striking when comparing South African civil and political
and socio-economic rights rulings is that despite the differentiation
pronounced by some of the judges, the practical treatment by the Court
regarding resource constraints in the final orders are remarkably similar.
In Electoral Commission, the Court concluded: "The respondents are to
make all reasonablearrangements necessary to enable the applicants and
other prisoners referred to in paragraph 3.1 above to register as voters on
234. August, 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) at 38, 1999 (3) SA 1, [2000] 1 LRC 608, (1999) 2
CHRLD 407 31.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

75

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

the national common voter's roll." '35 Whereas in Grootboom the Court's
order required: "The programme must include reasonablemeasures such
as, but not necessarily limited to, those contemplated in the Accelerated
Managed Land Settlement Programme, to provide relief for people who
have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in
' Likewise, the final order in
intolerable conditions or crisis situations."236
Treatment Action Campaign required: "[The government must] [t]ake
reasonable measures to extend the testing and counselling facilities at
hospitals and clinics throughout the public health sector to facilitate and
expedite the use of Nevirapine for the237purpose of reducing the risk of
mother-to-child transmission of HIV.
At the end of the day, the ultimate standard contained in the plain
language of the orders handed down by the Constitutional Court for both
types of rights has been reasonableness. While the Court may mean two
different types of reasonableness, the similarity of the orders should give
pause to anyone who attempts to draw a sharp line between these two
regimes of rights. In addition, it is not entirely clear, although it is likely,
that the Court uses the word reasonable differently in each context, as the
Court has never explicitly stated this proposition. 38
D. The ForgottenMinimum Core
Although the Court rejected the minimum core in Grootboom and
Treatment Action Campaign, the principle is not necessarily dead. The
Court held that the minimum core should be one of many factors to be
235. See August, 1999 (4) BCLR 363, 49 (CC). See also Gov't of Republic of S. Aft. &
Others v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 62.
This court does not have the information or expertise to enable it to decide what
those arrangements should be or how they should be effected. During the hearing
of this matter, counsel for the commission was invited to indicate what
arrangements for registration and voting would best suit the commission in order
to assist the court in making a precise order.
Id. 111 ("It is declared that the first and second respondents have an obligation to ensure that
reasonable measures are taken to provide for the security of rail commuters whilst they are making
use of rail transport services provided and ensured by, respectively, the first and second
respondents.").
236. Gov't of the Republic ofS. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) 99 (emphasis added).
237. Ministerof Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) 135.
238. See, e.g., Rail CommuterAction Group v TransnetLtd. t/a Metrorail&Others 2003 (12)
BCLR 1363 (SCA).
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considered when determining the reasonableness of a national plan. 239 The
Court effectively implemented this determination into the reasonableness
requirement that "a reasonable part of the national [budget] be devoted to
the needs of [the most desperate] .,,24o This arrangement begs the question:
if the Court is unwilling to identify what the minimum core is or might be,
how can it rationally ask courts to factor the minimum core into
determinations of whether a plan is reasonable, especially when the Court
found itself to be institutionally incapable of determining the minimum
core? Thus, like "reasonableness" and "availability," each judge's
subjective and individualized conceptions of the minimum core will subtly
and perhaps unconsciously affect their conception of what the minimum
core means in each case. The undefined ambiguous nature of the minimum
core concept and its infusion into reasonableness further exacerbates the
inherent subjectivity of a reasonableness inquiry.
IV. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES

A. Introduction
This Article's primary and most important purpose is to suggest
possible alternatives to the Court's current approach to the question of
available resources. Each proposed alternative is described below in turn.
B. The Treatment Action Campaign Amicus and High Court of Western
Cape Approach
1. The Treatment Action Campaign Amicus Approach
In TreatmentAction Campaign,the amici proposed that the long-term
cost of not distributing nevirparine to prevent mother-to-child transmission
of HIV would incur dramatically increased costs to the state than would
simple distribution of the drug.241 The amici argued that because the state
had a constitutional obligation to provide health services to those who
became infected, the distribution of the drug and the prevention of the
otherwise thousands of mother-to-child transmissions would in the long-

239. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
30-37; Treatment Action Campaign,
2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC)
34-35.
240. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 66.
241. See Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC) 116.
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term save enormous amounts of money. As stated previously, the Court
held:
The question whether budgetary constraints provided a legitimate
reason for not implementing a comprehensive policy for the use of
Nevirparine, including testing and counselling, was disputed. It was
contended that the use of The Drug would result in significant
savings in later years because it would reduce the number of HIV
positive children who would otherwise have to be treated in the
public health system for all the complications-it is not necessary
to deal with that issue. Conditions have changed since these
242
proceedingswere initiated.
The Constitutional Court effectively dodged consideration of this
approach because of increased allocations to the Department of Health's
budget during the proceedings. 243 The Constitutional Court has never
Western Cape
directly applied this proposal, but the High Court
244 of
Group.
Action
Commuter
Rail
in
so
did
effectively
2. The High Court Rail CommuterAction Group Approach
Although this case was not based on socio-economic rights, it could be
helpful, instructive, and transferable to these rights. As previously
discussed, this case was a suit from public train users for increased
security at train stations that was sought as a result of increasing crime on
South Africa's public train system. While the companies were in some
ways private entities, the High Court and the Constitutional Court both
found that their contractual obligation to fulfill their duties in "the public
interest," as well as their state like function, required that their contractual
Constitutional rights
duties be interpreted" in light of "the South 2African
45
to life, dignity, and freedom from violence.
However, the High Court took a more assertive approach than the
Constitutional Court regarding the question of resources.
The rail company's initial response was that the cost of such additional
measures was too expensive. In response to this defense, the Cape High
Court did not directly question the amount of money allocated to security

242. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 116 (emphasis added).
117,120.
243. Id
244. See Rail CommuterAction Group & Othersv TransnetLtd. t/a Metrorail& Others 2003
(3) BCLR 288 (C).
245. Rail Commuter Action Group, 2003 (12) BCLR 1363 (SCA) 20.
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by the company-government, but also did not accept this amount of money
as the entirety of available resources. 246 The Cape High Court peered into
the resources/revenue available to the commuter train rail company, rather
than merely what was allocated before the judgment by the government.247
The court found that the future increased revenue that would result in the
reduced fair evasion would result from increased security and would
largely compensate the increased cost of providing the security that
plaintiffs demanded.24 8 In short, the court took a pot of money that was
allocated, applied the plaintiff's requested measures, found that additional
funds would be needed, that the court found reasonable, and looked not
only at the costs to the state-company of taking these requested measures
but also as the potential profit and cost-saving that this action would have
on this pot of money. This argument echoes the Amicus filed in Treatment
Action Campaign, which was not decided on by the Constitutional Court
in that case. The implications of this approach are many. Similarly, one
might argue that the charging of fees for water services in rural areas is not
reasonable since the cost of creating and maintaining the administrative
and logistical apparatus to do so is more costly than not doing so. In
addressing the state defense of limited resources, the Court essentially
analyzed the comparative cost of action versus non-action instead of
focusing only on governmental allocation. At the same time, comparison
of this case to others is difficult because it involves a for profit entity.
While the approach applied the Cape High Court is a vast
improvement, it is not by any means revolutionary. While the Court did
peer into a closer analysis of "available resources" by finding that future
income from the measures they were requiring would make up for the cost
of their order, they still did so within the limits of the amount originally
allocated by the state and corporation. 24 9 The Court never directly
questions the wisdom of this initial allocation, nor apply the question of
"adequate budgetary support" or provision of the "appropriate financial
250
and human resources.
However, what this approach does accomplish is to increase the ambit
of the inquiry into available resources past only consideration of the
current year in question, and past the limited inquiry of allocation that
have both dominated the "available resources" inquiry in the past. The

246. See id.
at 159-64, 165, 170-71.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 165, 170-71.
249. Id.
250. Gov 't of the Republic ofS. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) 39, 68.
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Cape High Court approach fundamentally weakens the strength of the
available resources defense, and requires the government to provide more
extensive proof that the requested measures themselves do not themselves
increase available resources. It is the inverse of the approach of the amici
in Treatment Action Campaign,where it was argued that inaction would
in the long run cost more.
The Constitutional Court recently ruled on Rail Commuter Action
Group on appeal."' This court reached a similar (albeit solely declaratory)
outcome as the High Court, but reached the decision without the same
actual probing inquiry into the cost saving effects of increasing resources.
The Court substituted the specific probing analysis of the Cape High Court
with a general nod to the need to question claims of lack of available
resources, but without applying these principles to the specific resource
question before it during the analysis as the High Court had done. The
Constitutional Court held that:
A final consideration will be the relevant human and financial
resource constraints that may hamper the organ of state in meeting
its obligation. This last criterion will require careful consideration
when raised. In particular, an organ of state will not be held to have
reasonably performed a duty simply on the basis of a baldassertion
of resource constraints. Details of the precise character of the
resource constraints,whether human orfinancial,in the context of
the overall
resourcingof the organ of the state will need to be
252
provided.
As previously stated, this recent development is exactly the right direction
for the Court to take the question of available resources jurisprudence. It
addresses many of the criticisms addressed to the previous Constitutional
Court rulings. However, because the ruling was not made regarding socioeconomic rights and did not involve interpretation of the "available
resources" limitation, it is not certain that the Court would apply exactly
this methodology to the rights of healthcare, housing, and social security
as has been addressed in the previous socio-economic rights cases.
Moreover, while stating an approach to resource questions which is
exactly that which is needed, the Court does not actually apply its new
form of analysis to the case before it. Both the approach taken by the
Treatment Action Campaign amici and the Cape High Court in Rail
251. Rail Commuter Action Group & Others v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail& Others 2005 (4)
BCLR 301 (CC).
252. Id. 88.
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Commuter Action Group, are small but definitive, steps in the right
direction to interpretation of the available resources limitation.
C. Hand's Reasonableness Test
U.S. tort law offers an interesting, more radical alternative to South
Africa's current structure of the reasonableness standard of review. U.S.
law bases tort liability for individuals and other juristic entities, such as
corporations, upon the following reasonableness standard: actions result
in tort liability when "the reasonable man" would not engage in such
conduct.
An inherent problem with any definition of reasonableness is that what
is seen as reasonable is influenced highly by individual, subjective senses
and sensibilities.253 After all, if everybody agreed upon what were
reasonable in a given situation, we would live in a very different, less
conflict-ridden world. Thus, it must be true that the subjective and
differing views of South Africa's judges inherently influence
determinations of reasonableness.
In order to address this shortcoming of tort law, U.S. Judge Learned
Hand developed a numerical standard by which reasonableness could be
more objectively and consistently determined in tort cases:
[T]o provide against resulting injuries is a function of three
variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the
gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into
relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL. 254
253. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986).
254. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
Applied to the situation at bar, the likelihood that a barge will break from her fasts
and the damage she will do, vary with the place and time; for example, if a storm
threatens, the danger is greater; so it is, if she is in a crowded harbor where
moored barges are constantly being shifted about. On the other hand, the barge
must not be the bargee's prison, even though he lives aboard; he must go ashore
at times. We need not say whether, even in such crowded waters as New York
Harbor a bargee must be aboard at night at all; it may be that the custom is
otherwise, as Ward, J., supposed in "The Kathryn B. Guinan," supra; n 17 and that,
if so, the situation is one where custom should control.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

81

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

The South African Constitutional Court should adopt a modified
version of this approach, and apply it to governmental measures when
considering their reasonableness. The approach would still allow the
government great latitude in determining exactly how it will go about
fulfilling its obligations, while still requiring it to engage in a more
detailed evaluation of the reasonableness of measures. If a national plan
omits an action and step which would be less expensive to take when
compared to the cost of future harms, the plan will fail the reasonableness
test. In a sense, the injured plaintiff in Learned Hand's theory of tort
negligence becomes the entire society in context of socio-economic rights
litigation in South Africa.
While at first blush this approach appears to be identical to the
approach advocated for in Rail Commuter Action Group and Treatment
Action Campaign (discussed above), these two approaches are different
though they may mandate the same outcome. Unlike the Rail Commuter
Action Group and Treatment Action Campaign, the modified Hand
approach directly addresses the reasonableness requirement, whereas the
CommuterRailAction Group High Court and TreatmentAction Campaign
amici were focused specifically on the available resources defense and
available resources. The modified Learned Hand approach likewise does
not focus on the allocated amount of resources, but simply asks will action
or non-action eventually cost more. In contrast, the Rail CommuterAction
Group and Treatment Action Campaign approaches compared taking a
specific action to doing nothing, while the Learned Hand proposal would
compare various action plans all attempting different ways to fulfill the
obligation.
This modified Learned Hand approach would have a number of
beneficial effects for the South African people. In the first case, it will
address the shortcomings of democratic governance regarding the
provision of socio-economic rights and other rights. Because the
presidential and parliamentary term cycles last only five years, national
leadership will always have political incentives to take measures that
offset the true costs of measures past their own term into the unknown
future. Five-year election cycles create incentives to implement measures
the benefits of which are immediate and the costs of which are hidden,
subtle, or spread over the long term. For example, less stringent pollution

Id. This approach in the United States has been critiqued by many as in many ways inhumane,
cruel, and irrational. Those industries which would require expensive modifications to increase
safety are shielded from taking any preventive action, and so may omit to take any additional
measures to improve safety that cost a significant sum.
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controls today are a measure that will likely increase business today, but
incur enormous environmental costs in the long term that as yet unknown
future leaders will be left to deal with. The modified hand reasonableness
approach would be especially adept at identifying and finding
unreasonable these types of politically advantageous short-term-cost
saving measures.
There are of course a variety of shortcomings to this approach. The
numbers applied to the hand reasonableness formula are vulnerable to
mathematical manipulation. For example, how should the injury be
calculated in dollar values, and how can the preventative measures be
calculated? Applying the approach to Treatment Action Campaign the
court would have had to examine estimates of the number of people that
will become infected with HIV, and the projected costs of treating these
individuals many years or decades into the future. Such calculations are
invariably estimates, and the application of conservative or liberal
parameters to these estimates will invariably influence the outcome of the
numerical inquiry. At the same time, it is easily argued that the uncertainty
of numerical estimates or ranges, is less vulnerable to manipulation and
subjectivity than a general reasonableness test played out within the
definitively un-transparent recesses of individual judges minds. Another
way in which to diminish the concern of numerical manipulation is only
applying this test in certain circumstances. This author only advocates that
this modified hand theory be applied in cases where the difference in cost
of the "preventative measures" and the "cost of the harm" multiplied by
the probability that it will occur is significantly higher. The effect of this
approach is that if the government failed to take actions and measures
which at the time were available, and the cost of not taking these measures
could be calculated at the time and were manifestly more expensive than
taking them, the government plan would be unreasonable to the extent that
these measures had not and were not being implemented.
Support for this approach can be found with the Constitutional Court's
judgments: "A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether
other more desirable or favorable measures could have been adopted, or
whether public money could have been better spent. ' ' 2" The statement in
question does not fully address and reject the current proposal. In
conditions where the state is bound to provide a given obligatory socioeconomic rights service at a higher price (usually based on healthcare
costs) analyzing this situation is not so much deciding whether public
monies could be better spent (because they must be spent), but is more
255. Gov 't of the Republic ofS. Aft. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) 41.
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geared at determining how money can be least wasted. Again, the
requirement that the goal be pursued effectively and expeditiously requires
that there be at least some inquiry into the relative costs of measures.
D. The Minimum Core Approach
In response to the request for the application of the minimum core from
international human rights law to the South African Constitution, the Court
found that "[i]t is impossible to give everyone access even to a 'core'
service immediately."256 However, the minimum core concept provides the
basis for a potentially strong alternative approach to the available
resources question.
1. A Group Based Approach to the Minimum Core
A different approach to the minimum core concept is an approach
focused on group rights to the minimum core. The Court misses the main
point: the minimum core requirement is simply that-the minimum.257
Contrary to the Court's assertion that implementation of the minimum core
was impossible, immediate realization of the minimum core could be
accomplished today. A group rights approach would not confer a direct
personal entitlement to specific people for a specific good. Instead, this
approach would confer direct entitlements to groups of people. The
minimum core could be conceptualized as requiring the provision of a
certain amount of regional distribution centers to which groups of people
would have access to the bare minimum of their dietary, water, and
sanitation needs. Fulfilling the minimum core responsibility described in
General Comment 3 on the International Covenant of Economic Social and
Cultural Rights does not necessarily require the granting of direct personal
entitlements to actual individuals on demand. Instead, General Comment
3 requires that no "significant number of individuals [be] deprived of
essential foodstuffs," and that this goal can be accomplished through the
provision of direct entitlements to groups as groups."'
These potential distribution centers could spread equally across the
country. Each center could be provided with a set amount of materials and

256. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 35 (emphasis added).
257. The Court likewise seemed to overlook that the minimum core concept does take
available resources into account when considering whether a state has fulfilled its minimum core
obligations. See ICESCR, supranote 8, gen. cmt. 3, 10 ("By the same token, it must be noted that
any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take
account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned.").
258. Id.
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resources a year, and could distribute them on a first come first served
basis to those in a given geographical region.259 As resources increased,
more resource distribution centers could be created for new regions. The
minimum core provisions that could be distributed under such a plan could
be as little as materials, such as plastic sheeting for basic structures (the
right to shelter), water purification tablets (right to water) or re-hydration
packets/basic generic medicines (right to health services). The cost of such
programs would be rather minimal, but would have an enormous effect on
fulfilling the minimum core obligation, as well as meeting the requirement
of the right to dignity.
Although accomplished by the means of a group, community, or
regional approach, this methodology would just as legitimately fulfill the
minimum core obligation articulated in the International Covenant of
Economic Social and Cultural Rights. 260 As increasing funds became
available to the state, the definition of the minimum core could be
increasingly enlarged to the point where eventually it would encompass
individualized waterspouts for all.
2. A Minimum Core Defined by Past Government Action
A second workable approach to the minimum core is a minimum core
defined, not by the courts, but by the state itself The South African
government's many social security programs are provided to its citizens
and permanent residents based on income means tests. 261 These tests define
those groups that must be especially assisted by the state. Currently, the
means tests have arguably created a de-facto minimum core through
previous decisions of who will qualify for emergency need grants. In this
manner, the means tests, which are all determined by the democratically
elected legislature and president, could provide the basis for the court's
determination of the minimum core.
It would indeed make sense that government practice over time could
be relied upon by the courts in creating a minimum core definition, that the
courts could then simply adopt into their analysis. 262 This governmentally
defined minimum core addresses the primary concerns regarding the
minimum core that the court voiced when it rejected the direct application
259. Obviously, each person would have to be limited to one disbursement a year.
260. See ICESCR, supra note 8, gen. cmt. 3.
261. See generally SHAAMELA CASSIEM & JUDITH STREAK, BUDGETING FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS (Erika Coetzee ed., 2001).
262. At the very least, the government's targeted provision of grants is a de-facto baseline that
cannot be retreated from, since reduction of service provision would entail a deliberatively
retrogressive measures would have to be measured.
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of the concept: the lack of judicial competence, and the lack of accurate
information. 63 With this proposed approach, the court could look at the
previous government criteria for initiating emergency assistance to the
population, and could then base the minimum core on these state decided
figures. While the court has unhelpfully overly relied on the state's
allocation decisions as a means to define what resources are available,
there is no reason why it could not more helpfully rely on the state's on
determinations of the levels of need that identified who in society was the
most needy and desperate. Relying on the state's own numbers, the court
could define the minimum core.
E. The Approach of Dignity
The Constitutional Court has found that the right to dignity must be
read into the other socio-economic rights. Although mentioned often, it is
unclear what direct effect the right to dignity has on substantive socioeconomic rights. Despite the Court's rejection of the minimum core, the
existence of the right to dignity would appear to require the minimum
core, and/or something more than if the right to dignity had not been
included in the Constitution. The right to dignity has "to be taken into
account along with the availability of... resources in determining whether
the State has complied with the constitutional standard of
reasonableness." 2 " But what does this requirement mean? Moreover, how
does the right to dignity interact directly with the available resources
limitation?
What occurs to the author is that the right to dignity may be the means
by which the Constitutional Court would object to the allocation of only
one rand to a socio-economic right. Like the inquiry into reasonableness,
the inquiry into available resources must necessarily take into account the
right to dignity. 265 As observed by Sandra Liebenberg:
263. Gov't ofthe Republic ofS. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC)
32-33.
264. Khosa & Others v MinisterofSoc. Dev. & Others,Mahlaule& Others v Ministerof Soc.
Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 44.
265. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 11 BCLR
1169 (CC) 83.
Section 26, read in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole, must mean that the
respondents have a right to reasonable action by the State in all circumstances and
with particular regard to human dignity. In short, I emphasise that human beings
are required to be treated as human beings.
Id. 83.
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It is also a pity that the judgment implies that the available
resources of the State will play a key role in determining the
reasonableness of government programmes as opposed to affirming
that the allocation of resources must be reasonable and capable of
facilitating the fulfilment of socioeconomic rights. The resources
available for social spending are not objective, scientific facts, but
a product of political decisions and choices in the spheres of macroeconomic, revenue and budgetary policies. If these decisions, or at
least the processes through which they are made, are regarded as
unassailable, the State will in effect be allowed to determine the
extent of its own obligations under the constitution.266
Whatever process the Court goes through, to ignore the consideration of
making an amount of money available that comports with the right to
dignity, or dignified resource provision, conveniently ignores the unique
existence of the justiciable right to dignity in the South African
Constitution.
Advocates for increased funding for socio-economic rights should
explore relying on the right to dignity to keep allocated funds from
dropping below extreme levels. A policy that will leave the majority of the
population, or even a significant portion of the population, with no redress
whatsoever, is perhaps one of the greatest affronts to the dignity and
equality of these unassisted people. As Professor Sandra Liebenberg
advances in her paper "The Value of Human Dignity in interpreting SocioEconomic Rights":
Respect for human dignity requires society to marshal its resources
and respond strongly to situations in which vulnerable groups are
unable to gain access to basic socioeconomic needs. The
consequences of the deprivation will be severe (either in terms of
threats to life or health), and erode the foundation for the further
development of the person. To value human beings as a society
demands an appropriate response. The overall resources and
capacity of the society concerned will naturally determine this
response. But dignity demands that society do its utmost to ensure
that those groups who are unable to gain access to basic
socioeconomic needs are assisted. This is a duty recognised by the
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in

266. See Liebenberg, supra note 28, at 20-21.
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interpreting states parties obligations under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).267
While the Court has spoken at length of the importance of dignity, it
has not yet applied the right to the question of available resources. When
the state refuses to commit many resources to a socio-economic right,
reading the available resources limitation in light of the right to dignity
must require more on the part of the court, or the state, than the ability to
allocate whatever amount is convenient at the time.
The Court should take notice of the logic behind Liebenberg's
determination that in order to properly affect the right to dignity in when
addressing socio-economic rights, at the very least something more is
needed than is currently being provided by the Constitutional Court of
South Africa.268
An approach that read dignity into the question of available resources,
would necessarily have to consider the effects of the previous programs as
well as force consideration of the other resources that are potentially
available, but not yet made available through specific allocation by the
state. One cannot say that the state is respecting the dignity of those within
its borders when it allocates one dollar to the realization of a socioeconomic right.
F. The Auditor General
As previously discussed in Part IH, individual litigants are poorly
placed to challenge the representations of the government regarding the
availability of resources. While litigants may ultimately gain access to
budget reports, there is in turn no manner in which the accuracy of these
reports themselves can be confirmed. A better positioned entity is
necessary to fulfill this role.
A potentially ideal entity for this role would be the Auditor General of
South Africa. The Auditor General should be looked to in socio-economic
rights litigation to independently determine resource availability. With this
independent entity infused into litigation, the state would lose its
monopoly on the information and evidence pertaining to the question of
available resources. Not only would the Auditor General be the best choice
for practical and policy reasons, the constitution can be read to subtly
suggest such a role for the General. Chapter 14 section 181(2) of the South
African constitution, which describes the duties of the Auditor General and

267. Liebenberg, supra note 85, at 7.
268. Id. at 9-12.
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sister institutions, states "these institutions are independent, and subject
only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must
exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favor or
prejudice., 269 When read with section 26(2) and 27(2), which require that
the state "take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right," an
argument that its unique impartial position requires the Auditor General
is not impossible to imagine. 27" However, more importantly, nothing in
Chapter 14 prevents the Auditor General from assuming such a role
especially when in support of national legislation.27 1
Such an additional burden for the Auditor General would be quite small
given the small amount of socio-economic rights cases that reach the
Constitutional Court and the lower courts in any given year.
VII. THE CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY APPROACH
The recent development that has the strongest implications for the
question of available resources jurisprudence in South Africa, is the recent

269. S. AFR.CONST. 1996.
270. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 6 (Bill of Rights) §§ 26-27.

271. Id.
Functions of Auditor-General
188. (1) The Auditor-Generalmust audit and report on the accounts,financial
statements andfinancial management of
a.
all nationalandprovincialstate departments and administrations;
b.
all municipalities;and
c.
any otherinstitutionor accountingentity requiredby nationalorprovincial
legislation to be audited by the Auditor-General.
(2) In addition to the duties prescribed in subsection (1), and subject to any
legislation, the Auditor-Generalmay audit andreport on the accounts,financial
statements andfinancial management of
a.
any institutionfunded from the National Revenue Fund or a Provincial
Revenue Fundor by a municipality; or
b.
any institutionthat is authorisedin terms of any law to receive money for
apublic purpose.
(3) The Auditor-Generalmustsubmit audit reports to any legislaturethat has a
direct interest in the audit, and to any other authorityprescribed by national
legislation.All reports must be made public.
(4) The Auditor-Generalhas the additionalpowers andfunctions prescribedby
nationallegislation.
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U.S. jurisprudence of the state of New York. In Campaignfor Fiscal
Equity v. State ofNew York,272 highest court of New York determined that
the state had failed in its state constitutional obligation to provide a sound
basic education to a significant number of New York City students, which
the court determined was a "meaningful high school education" and that
273
"[t]he State must assure that some essential [resources] are provided.,
The New York Court of Appeals implicitly affirmed the finding of the
Supreme Court of New York that the sound basic education enshrined in
the state constitution required that:
The following parameters must guide defendants' reform of the
current system. This court has held that a sound basic education
mandated by the Education Article consists of the foundational
skills that students need to become productive citizens capable of
civic engagement and sustaining competitive employment. In order
to ensure that public schools offer a sound basic education the State
must take steps to ensure at least the following resources, which, as
described in the body of this opinion, are for the most part currently
not given to New York City's public school students:
1. Sufficient numbers of qualified teachers, principals and other
personnel.
2. Appropriate class sizes.
3. Adequate and accessible school buildings with sufficient space
to ensure appropriate class size and implementation of a sound
curriculum.
4. Sufficient and up to date books, supplies, libraries, educational
technology and laboratories.
5. Suitable curricula, including an expanded platform of programs
to help at risk students by giving them "more time on task."
6. Adequate resources for students with extraordinary needs.
7. A safe orderly environment. 4
The framework of analysis adopted by the New York Court of Appeals is
definitely more specific in determining the specific minimums that the
right to education entails in New York State than is that of the South
African Constitutional Court. However, this specificity is not the most

272.
273.
274.
3 (2003),

See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (N.Y Ct. App. 2003).
Id.at 914.
CFE v. State of New York: An Analytical Overview of the Court of Appeals Decision,
availableat http://www.cfequity.org/CoAAnalysis7-16-03.PDF.
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revolutionary aspect of the judgment. In reaching its conclusion, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the state of New York had to:
1. Ascertain the actual cost of providing a sound basic education in
New York City;
2. Ensure that every school has the resources necessary for
providing the opportunity for a sound basic education; and
3. Ensure a system of accountability to measure whether the
reforms actually
provide the opportunity for a sound basic
2 75
education.
The state failed to comply with the order of creating this "costing out"
study, and in response the lower New York Supreme Court appointed three
referees to calculate these costs in its stead.276
Subsequently, based on the recommendation of these referees who had
reviewed evidence submitted by an exhaustive amount of experts at trial,
on remand to the New York Supreme Court from the New York Court of
Appeals, the lower court determined that the state needed to increase
funding by $5.63 billion for operating expenses and $9.2 billion for
facilities.277
The extensive process, and the reasoned result of the board of referees,
should put to rest the fears expressed by the Constitutional Court that
courts inherently lack the capacity to fairly evaluate specific funding
requirements for socio-economic rights.
The Constitutional Court should consider the possibilities that this
approach suggest for its own review of the sufficiency of resource
provision by the state to support socio-economic rights.
Although, on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals did not see
through its initial approach and jurisprudence to its ultimate conclusion,
there is no need that the South African Constitutional Court, a more
progressive body of jurists working within the confines of a more

275. See id. at 5; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 929-30 (CFE II).
In other words, the State is charged with the responsibility for objectively determining how much
money is actually needed to provide all students the opportunity for a meaningful high school
education, for devising a fair funding approach that will ensure that each school obtains the
requisite level of resources, and for developing accountability mechanisms that will ensure that the
money is used effectively for the stated purpose of providing all students a meaningful educational
opportunity.
276. Order of the Supreme Court of New York (appointing the three referees),
http://www.cfequity.org/.
277. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 233 N.Y.L.J. 3, 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
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progressive jurisprudence, based on a more progressive constitution,
should need to similarly stumble.278
Despite its ultimate shortcoming, at the very least this decision shows
that the budgetary determinations can be subject to judicial scrutiny, albeit
deferential, without creating a constitutional crisis. Presently, within the
realm ofsocio-economic rights, the South African Constitutional Court has
yet to require the kind of in-depth adversarial adjudication of the state's
allocated funding as did the state of New York.
At the same time, it should be noted that there are very large
differences between the state constitution of New York and the South
African Constitution. Most importantly, the South African Constitution
guarantees socio-economic rights only within "available resources," while
the New York state constitutional right to education has no such inherent
internal limitation (it is limited only by the small content of the right as
textually articulated in the New York Constitution and interpreted by the
New York Court of Appeals).
Nevertheless, to the extent that the previous and current hesitation of
the Constitutional Court to hand down judgments that are aimed at "rearranging of budgets," this hesitation need not be based on a fear that
society will collapse, that the separation of powers doctrine will be
irreparably harmed, or that the court simply lacks the competence to carry
out a more probing complicated review and calculations that occurred in
Campaignfor FiscalEquity. 2 9

278. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals found that it owed the projected estimate of
the cost of a sound education offered by the state deference over the report of the referees upon
which the trial court had based its higher figure. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of
New York, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 28-30 (N.Y. 2006). The New York Court of Appeals found that the state
had spoken as to its assessment estimate, and that this decision required judicial deference. See id.
In addition, the court established that it would subject the reasoning behind the calculations to a
rational basis test, and found that the reasoning behind the amount of funding proposed by the state
passed this rational basis test. See id. at 27-30.
Although it harkens back to having the allocated resources of the state simply determine the
content of the right, even this court (although it came to the wrong conclusion), required the state
to specifically justify its proposed amount of funding to support the right to education in New York.
In dissent, Chief Judge Kaye found that the state was not owed deference because the legislation
pointed to as the voice of the state was never passed by both houses of the legislature. See id. at 3438. Chief Judge Kayes also identified deficiencies in the reasoning supporting the state's proposed
funding amount of support for the state's estimate, and found that it failed a rational basis test. See
id at 39-40. Kaye's dissent provides compelling reasoning and a strong framework by which a
state's resource allocation can be challenged in terms of both deference and reasoning. Campaign
for FiscalEquity, 8 N.Y.3d at 39-40.
279. See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA
721 (CC) $ 38.
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V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, South Africa, has come incredibly far in interpreting
constitutional socio-economic rights in a way that substantively gives
effect to these rights for the people of South Africa. However, as this
Article has attempted to show, there is much more that can be done to fully
develop the jurisprudence surrounding the available resources limitations
of sections 26 and 27. Without further developing this jurisprudence, the
great promise that this revolutionary constitution born from the ashes of
the apartheid system, the sacrifices of many lives given in the struggles
against apartheid will have been given for something less than intended.
The inclusion of socio-economic rights came from the acknowledgment
that without these rights, the political transition from apartheid to
democracy would ring hollow for the vast majority of black South
Africans impoverished by the history of apartheid. For this reason, the full
actualization of South Africa's constitutional socio-economic rights are
notjust an abstract theory of discussion for constitutional scholars, but will
represent the best hope for the fulfillment of racial justice in contemporary
South Africa. Indeed, if there is not further development of the socioeconomic available resources jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, the socio-economic rights that many fought so hard for
during apartheid, will remain, nothing but: rights waitingfor change.
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